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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis deals with the issue of Laffer curve. According to the idea of the Laffer curve 
when the tax rate exceeds certain treshold (revenue-maximizing tax rate) the tax revenue 
would in absolute terms decrease with rising tax rate. Therefore this thesis tries to discover 
whether those facts are valid in the corporate income taxation for 20 OECD countries for the 
time period from 1965 to 2006. 
The structure of the thesis could be divided into three parts. In first introductory chapters the 
issue of taxation would be discussed in general. It will briefly examine the history of taxation 
and explore the theory of taxation and tax systems. The second part of this thesis will focus on 
the Laffer curve in detail. Third chapter will introduce the theory behind Laffer curve and 
discuss its properties for different types of taxation. In the following chapter the literature and 
different possibilities of estimation of the Laffer curve and (or) Laffer effects would be 
reviewed. Fifth chapter focuses on the corporate income taxation per se and examines the 
development of corporate income tax revenue and rates in our sample countries.  
In the last part of this thesis the econometric estimates of the Laffer curve for corporate 
income taxation are presented. The Laffer curve would be estimated for three selected 
countries and then for the whole sample of 20 OECD countries on the panel data. Last section 
then states conclusions of this thesis, mainly that the Laffer effects for corporate income 
taxation were confirmed and thus the traditional shape of the Laffer curve was validated. 
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Abstrakt 
 
 
Tato rigorózní práce se zabývá Lafferovou křivkou. Teorie Lafferovy křivky nám říká, že 
pokud výše daňové sazby překročí určitou mez (daňová sazba maximalizující příjmy), tak 
daňové výnosy budou dále v absolutních číslech klesat se vzrůstající daňovou sazbou. Proto 
se tato práce snaží zjistit, zda jsou tyto skutečnosti platné pro daň z příjmu korporací pro 20 
OECD zemí v časovém období od roku 1965 do 2006. 
Struktura práce může být rozdělena do tří částí. V prvních dvou úvodních kapitolách bude 
krátce diskutována historie a teorie zdanění a daňových systémů. Druhá část práce se zaměří 
na Lafferovu křivku. Třetí kapitola prozkoumá teorii Lafferovy křivky a bude diskutovat její 
vlastnosti pro různé druhy daní. V následující kapitole je zhodnocena literatura týkající se 
možných způsobů odhadů této křivky a Lafferových efektů. Pátá kapitola se pak zaměřuje na 
korporátní daň z příjmu a zkoumá vývoj daňových sazeb a státních výnosů v našem vzorku 
zemí. 
V poslední části této práce jsou prezentovány ekonometrické odhady Lafferovy křivky pro 
daň z příjmu korporací. Nejdříve je Lafferova křivka odhadnuta pro tři vybrané země a poté 
pro celý vzorek 20 OECD zemí na základě panelových dat. Závěrečná sekce poté činí závěry 
z naší analýzy, především potvrzuje, že tradiční tvar Lafferovy křivky pro korporátní daň 
z příjmu byl ověřen.   
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Introduction 
 
It has been said that the virtue of the Laffer curve is that you can explain 
it to a congressman in half an hour and he can talk about it for six months. 
 
Hal Varian (Intermediate Microeconomics) 
 
This thesis will deal with the issue of Laffer curve. As the quotation suggests the 
concept of this curve and the theory behind is fairly simple. The basic idea lies in the fact that 
the tax revenue depend on the tax rates, however the dependence is not linear. According to 
the idea of Laffer curve when the tax rate exceeds certain treshold (revenue-maximizing tax 
rate) the tax revenue eventually decrease with rising tax rate. More detailed explanation 
would be given further in the text. We would thus explore whether this concept is valid for 
corporate income taxation and whether we can estimate the Laffer curve for selected OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. 
We can divide the structure of the thesis into three parts. In first introductory 
chapters we would  discuss the issue of taxation in general. We will briefly examine the 
history of taxation and explore the theory of taxation and tax systems. The main emphasis 
would be devoted to the size of the state sector. This analysis would show us that the state 
sector grew significantly in last century and therefore there were growing requirements for the 
funds to finance the state activities. Thus it is legitimate to investigate whether further 
increase in taxes would constitute the increase of revenue or not. 
In the second part of the thesis we focus on the Laffer curve in detail. Third chapter 
will introduce the theory behind Laffer curve and discuss its properties. In the following 
chapter we would review the literature and different possibilities of estimation of the Laffer 
curve and (or) Laffer effects. Fifth chapter serve as a bridge between the second and third part 
of this thesis. It focuses on the corporate income taxation and we would examine the 
development and its possible explanations for corporate income tax revenue and rates in 
sample of 20 OECD countries for the time period from 1965 to 2006. 
Last two chapters estimate the Laffer curve for corporate income taxation using the 
econometric models. In chapter six we try to estimate the Laffer curve for three selected 
countries (Ireland, France and the United Kingdom) using the time-series estimation 
technique. In the final chapter the Laffer curve will be estimated for the whole sample of 20 
OECD countries on the panel data. Last section then concludes. 
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Before we proceed, we can state two hypothesis about the estimations of Laffer 
curve. We would hypothesize that Laffer effects will be significant for corporate income 
taxation and thus the standard shape of the Laffer curve would be confirmed by our estimates.  
Moreover, we suppose that there are certain differences in the tax systems and tax revenue 
collection among OECD countries and thus the results would differ for different countries. 
This hypothesis is also one of the reasons why we included the country-specific estimates into 
our analysis in chapter six. Let us now shortly review the history of taxation in the first 
chapter.  
  5
1 A Brief History of Taxation 
 
This passage is rather an overview of some important aspects in the history of 
taxation and therefore it is not a comperhensive summary. It also focuses mainly on the 
western countries such as European countries and to some extend the United States (U.S.). 
The history of taxation goes far back to the ancient times and is highly connected to the 
development of states.   
 
1.1 Ancient Period 
 
The first known system of taxation was discovered in Ancient Egypt around 3000 
BC - 2800 BC in the first dynasty of the Old Kingdom. Administrative texts, literary texts, 
letters and scenes from tombs have provided evidence that the taxes and tax collectors were 
present at that time. The pharaoh would then conduct a bienneial royal tour around the 
country and the inhabitans of Egypt and thus he collected taxes.1  
The early taxation is also mentioned in the Bible:  
 
But when the crop comes in, give a fifth of it to Pharaoh. The other four-fifths you may keep 
as seed for the fields and as food for yourselves and your households and your children.2 
 
However taxes did not play the major role in the ancient world. The purpose of the 
taxation was mainly to finance military forces, public buildings and administration of the 
given territory. The tax collection was mainly irregular and especially the in-kind and corvée 
taxation were typical for the ancient era.3  
1.1.A Ancient Rome 
 
As an example we can take one of the greatest  empire of that era - Ancient Rome 
and examine its system of taxation little closer.4 Roman empire relied on the tribute from 
state-owned resources. The second source of  the state income was the tax collection. Apart 
from military purposes and public administration the expenditures of the Roman empire went 
                                                 
1 In University of Pennsylvania  (2002). 
2 In Holy Bible – New International Vesion (1978) chapter 47, verse 24. 
3 In Urbášková (1998). 
4 This section about Ancient Rome is based mainly on Angresano (1995), pp. 39-60. 
  6
for the entertainment, the city of Rome’s grain supply and salaries of civil servants. The 
system of taxation in Ancient  Rome consisted of three main taxes. 
 There was a poll tax5 on adults between the age of 12 to 65. This tax was imposed 
on males or on all adults depending upon the province. However, the largest revenue came 
from the property tax. It was a fixed amount and therefore it did not vary with the size of the 
crop.  
Another important tax was the harbor tax, which would have been called customs 
duties in the present days. The rate was set between 2 – 2.5 % of the value of goods imported 
into the empire. The remarkable exception were the luxury goods imported from eastern 
provinces which faced 25 % import duty. This rather high rate was set for two purposes. It 
should have discouraged the outflow of the currency from Rome and obtain the revenue from 
wealthy Romans. Their demand for the luxury goods was highly inelastic and therefore their 
willingness to buy those goods did not decrease much even with that high tax rate.6 
 This system of taxation and state policies led to the situation where Romans 
residing in Italy benefited. They were responsible for paying only the miscellaneous taxes, 
however they enjoyed the most fruits of state redistribution. They enjoyed the benefits of 
protection, public services and free grain (inhabitants of Rome) and all this was financed 
primarily by the provinces.7  
Thanks to the previous short excursion to the system of ancient taxation, it is 
apparent that the redistribution role of taxation played significant function. It is also obvious 
that it was not always the redistribution from rich to poor, rather it depended on the place 
where the inhabitants of the Roman empire were settled.    
 
1.2 Taxation in the Middle Ages 
 
In different territories different state systems and thus different tax systems were 
evolving during that time, however we could observe some similarities in the forms of 
taxation which were collected. The following section shortly summarize these similarities. 
The most important resource and factor of production in the feudal system was land. 
Therefore its ownership was the key factor which was subject to taxation. The original owner 
of the land was the monarch. He either administered the land by his own vassals or he gave 
                                                 
5 See page 29 for explanation of this term. 
6 In Angresano (1995), pp. 40-47. 
7 Ibid, p.50. 
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the land to the barons or to the Church8 or he might have lent the land to the vassals or 
peasants.  Therefore land was either publicly owned (by the monarch), owned by the Church, 
by private individuals (such as barons, vassals and peasants) or by group acting 
cooperatively.9 
Frequently the tenancy of the land was somehow  taxed by the landlords or by the 
monarch. Another forms of taxation were, inter alia, the mandatory gifts for the emperor, 
import duties, and every holder of the land10 was obliged to provide either military service or 
labor in return for the right to til his land.11 
1.2.A Taxation System in the Cities 
 
The situation in the cities was rather different than in the feudal manors. As time was 
flowing, the cities earned major importance in the Middle Ages’ system. The most important 
factor of production in the cities was apparently the labor. Craftsmen and merchants 
associated into guilds, which had the eminent privilege from the monarch to manufacture the 
products and run the business.  
With the evolution of cities and monetary system, apart from in-kind and labor 
taxation, the monetary taxation started to play an important role. Those monetary taxes could 
have been indirect (paid on transaction of goods) or direct (paid on wealth or on income).12 
Many cities have also negotiated some sort of charters (e.g. to brew beer) with the monarch 
and evidently the cities have paid some sort of tax for this privilege. 
Before we proceed to the modern period of our history we could summarize the 
feudal system of the Middle Ages and its implications for the on-coming period. The public 
expenditures mainly on evolving professional military forces, administration and judiciary 
significantly rose.13 Thus the need of taxation was more considerable. That is why the 
monetary taxes started to play much more important role and the main income of the public 
budget changed from the feudal in-kind taxes to the monetary taxation of the cities. However, 
the taxation was still mainly irregular and non-lasting. Consequently, the monarch had to 
appeal the nobility for the permission to introduce certain tax repeatedly.  
 
                                                 
8 Obviously this gratuity of the monarch was not disintrested and the monarch required some services in return. 
See e.g. Angresano (1995), pp. 63-69 for further details. 
9 In Angresano (1995), p. 74. 
10 This could have been ordinary peasant or even the duke. 
11 In Salanié (2003), p. 2. 
12 In Salanié (2003), p. 2., for further discussion see next chapter. 
13 In Grúň (2004), p. 38. 
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1.3 Pre-Modern Period  
 
The modification of the taxation system is a long term process. However, during the 
15th and 16th century the taxation system started to gradually function on the basis of regular 
and periodical revenue.14 Therefore taxes became permanent source of state budget and fiscal 
policy began to form.  
The European countries started to discover new land mainly in Africa and America 
and they began to derive benefits from their colonial possesions. Also the trade policy of the 
colonial powers have changed and the emphasis was given on the custom duties, internal 
(between provincies) as well as external.15 The custom duties thus became the main source of 
the state budget in the colonial powers. States started to be heavily protective and in 
accordance with the mercantilism they put emphasis on the foreign trade as the most 
important policy. Hence, they exported their manufactured goods mainly to their colonies and 
the custom duties on imports from those countries were set very high in order to collect 
revenue to the state budget as wel as to protect the domestic market from massive inflow of 
imports.  
1.3.A Introduction of Income Taxes  
 
The Napoleonic wars and the need of countries to finance the growing war 
expenditures led certain governments to introduce first modern income taxes. In England the 
tax reform which created this income tax took place in year 1798.16 The indirect taxes and 
customs duties could have been thus lowered. However, in peace time the income tax was 
again abolished and  in England was re-established by the prime minister Robert Peel in year 
1842.17 Other countries followed this suit of England and income tax was introduced in 
Prussia, France and after overcoming the constitutional objectives of the Supreme Court this 
tax was introduced in the United States as well in the beggining of the 20th century.18  
1.3.B Growing State Expenditures 
 
The rising expenditures of the state budget were not caused solely by the war 
expenditures. The state bureaucracy started to influence the life of people in many spheres of 
                                                 
14 Ibid, p. 39. 
15 In Salanié (2003), p. 3. 
16 See Grúň (2004), p. 47 for details. 
17 In Salanié (2003), p. 3. 
18 See Grúň (2004), pp. 47 - 48 for details. 
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life. Some domains of private sphere were increasingly influenced by the state sector. We 
could mention,  inter alia, the educational system, social services and even architecture or 
arts.  
The growing state sector had an implication that the taxes itself were not enough to 
cover the rising expenditures of the state budgets. Therefore, the monarch or the governments 
had to partialy finance the state expenditures by the credit loans. These loans had different 
forms (e.g. from commercial banks), but evidently it led to the birth of national debt 
phenomenon. 
We can summarize by saying that the state sector was growing and consequently the 
state revenue were consolidated in order to ensure the financial resources for the rising 
requirements of the state budgets. However, more frequently the state revenue from taxes and 
fees were not able to cover the rising expenditures and states became indebted. 
 
1.4 Modern period 
 
The taxation system was influenced and shaped by the thinkers of that era. Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and others19 did support the formation of liberalism and minor state 
intervention to the process of the economy. The liberal ideas influenced mainly the 
dominance of the free trade and thus the custom duties were cut rapidly. Therefore there was 
an attempt to restrcit the tax collection solely for the inside and outside security and for the 
purposes of law and order.20 
Despite of the fact that the liberal ideas were extending, the state sector was rather 
growing than diminishing. That was due to the fact that mainly the military expenditures were 
rising (new technologies, management and administration of colonies and discovering of new 
colonies), also administration and expenditures on police, courts and social benefits were 
increasing. Further we cannot forget that most of the states were indebted as was explained 
above and they had to service their debt.21   
The tax systems started to be compact and they began to play fundamental role in 
the economy. Balances of revenue and expenditures of state budgets were annually 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Screpanti & Zamagni (1993), pp. 54-118 for their detailed ideas and for further references. 
20 In Grúň (2004), p. 63. 
21 See Grúň (2004), p.64 for details. 
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compounded and gradually they became analogous to the state budgets as we know them 
from the present.  
Taxes were already distinguished on direct and indirect. And almost every tax was 
paid in monetary units. We should mention that the public sector still constituted only less 
than 10 percent of national income in most of the European countries and even less than 5 
percent of national income in the U.S. in the end of 19th century.22  
1.4.A Reasons of Rapid Increase of the Public Sector in the 20th Century 
 
In the 20th century the public sector grew rapidly and we should now focus on the 
reasons of this rapid increase. 23 The first reason is the strong and permanent increase of social 
expenditures which laid the foundation of the modern welfare state as we know it from most 
developed countries in present period. The origin of the welfare state dates back to the 1883 to 
Prussia, when the compulsory health insurance was introduced. Only after six years also the 
pension system in Prussia was created. Other countries followed this suit mainly in the 
beggining of the 20th century.24  We could have witnessed also the birth of unemployment 
benefits in this time period.  
 Secondly, most of the European countries as well as the U.S. were involved in two 
main war conflicts in the 20th century. Two world wars did increase the military expenditures 
dramatically. Even between those two war conflicts the size of public sector did not reduce 
much.25 
 In the countries which were directly involved in the war, expenditures on military 
purposes reached or even passed the half of the national income. Some of these skyrocketing 
expenditures were financed by borrowing, but most of them were covered by the tax 
increases. Therefore for example the top marginal rates of income taxes became even 
confiscatory above 90 percent in the United States and United Kingdom during the World 
War Two.26  The question which would be address in this thesis is then straightforward – do 
these tax increases indeed increase the relevant tax revenue ? 
 
                                                 
22 In Salanié (2003), p. 3. 
23 These reasons are taken from historical and social point of view, for economic explanations of the growth of 
the public sector in developed economies in 20th century see next chapter where  the economic reasons are 
elaborated more precisely. 
24 See Salanié (2003), p. 4. for exact dates of introduction of these social welfare benefits in different states. 
25 As reasons we can mention the birth of the welfare state in many countries, state funds were also needed for 
the reconstruction of destroyed regions and infrastructure etc. 
26 See Salanié (2003), p. 4. 
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1.4.B The Development after the World War Two 
 
After the Second World War in many countries the state finances were used again 
for the reconstruction of destroyed areas. Moreover, the social contributions were 
consolidated, for example the Beveridge Report27 helped to consolidate the welfare 
contributions in the United Kingdom.   
The new tax called value-added tax (VAT) was introduced since 1954 in France. 
VAT was introduced in the European Communities (EC) in the late 1960’s and it was 
intended to replace four types of sales or turnover taxes, which existed until then in different 
European countries.28 This tax constitutes almost 20% of tax collection in the European 
Union29 in the present.30  
As a reaction to the growing budget deficits and “stagflation” in the 1970’s there 
were introduced fiscal reforms from right-wing governments. In some countries the top 
marginal rates of personal and corporate income taxes were dramatically reduced in order to 
support growth.31 In the United States this reduction of top marginal rate fell during several 
years from 70 percent to 28 percent in year 1986.32 In most of the European countries similar 
reforms took place, however they were more modest.  
1.4.C Total Tax Revenue in Different Countries 
  
In Table 1.1 you can find the development of tax revenue in chosen OECD countries 
since year 1955 to year 2005. From this table it is evident that the total tax burden varies 
across the developed countries rather considerably. According to the table there are countries, 
where the total tax revenue constitute almost one half of the GDP of the country (in Sweden it 
even exceeds one half). Contrariwise, there are countries where the total tax revenue do not 
reach one third of the GDP such as United States, Japan or Switzerland. 
 In the table there is also some evidence on the variation in time. However, we can 
see that the level of tax revenue was rather stable after the WW2 in many developed 
countries. In some countries there was rather gradual increase of the tax revenue such as in 
                                                 
27 See e.g. Angresano (1995) pp. 273-276  for detailed description of this report. 
28  See e.g. El-Agraa (2007), pp. 282-283  for more detailed description of these sales and turnover taxes 
29 The autor is aware of the differences between the EC and European Union (EU). Therefore the distinction is 
done in the text and to the terms is reffered usually separately. 
30 See e.g. European Commission (2008) for more detailed figures on VAT and its collection. 
31 See the discussion concerning the supply-side economics and mentioned references in chapter three. 
32 In Salanié (2003), p. 4. 
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United Kingdom, France or Switzerland. However, in Sweden the tax revenue more than 
doubled since 1955 and thus they rose rather rapidly up to 51.1% of GDP. 
Table 1.1: Total Tax Revenue in Chosen OECD Countries 
Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in chosen OECD countries 
  1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
France n.a. 34.5 35.5 42.4 42.9 44.3 
United Kingdom 29.7 30.4 35.3 37.7 35 37.2 
Germany 30.8 31.6 35.3 37.2 37.2 34.7 
Sweden 25.5 35 41.6 47.8 48.1 51.1 
Switzerland 19.2 17.5 24.5 26.1 27.8 30 
United States 23.6 25 25.6 25.6 27.9 26.8 
Japan 17.1 18.3 20.9 27.4 26.9 27.4 
OECD-total33 24 25.8 29.7 32.9 35.1 36.2 
EU-1533 26 27.8 32.4 37.7 39.2 39.7 
Source: OECD (2006) 
n.a. stands for not available. 
1.4.D Closing Remarks 
 
From this short excursion to the history of taxation it seems to be apparent that the 
legacy of the history has implications into the present. Thanks to the historical development 
countries do differ in the magnitude of taxes as well as in the structure of their tax systems.  
Present development has also important implications for the tax systems. The 
environmental taxes are already part of the taxation system and their significance would be 
probably more apparent in the future. There are opinions which support the double dividend 
hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that the environmental taxation would not only contribute 
to the better environment but also reduce the costs of tax system.34 
We should also mention the globalization of the world’s economy. Therefore, the 
capital is more mobile and people and firms can vote with their feet.35 According to this 
theory inhabitans and firms choose in which country to reside according to tax rates and levels 
of public goods.  In theory this is possible, however in the practice there are some limitations 
and impediments in the migration of people and firms into different countries even within the 
                                                 
33 The unweighted averages were used,  the EU 15 area countries are : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. 
34 See e.g. Goulder (1995) or Bovenberg (1999) for the description of different forms of double dividend 
hypothesis. 
35 See e.g. Mueller (2003) pp. 199-202 for detailed description of this theory and for empirical evidence. 
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European Union.36 However, even this phenomenon of tax competition37 contributed to the 
lowering of personal and corporate income taxes and mainly to their top marginal rates. This 
issue concerning the corporate income taxation would be discussed in greater detail in chapter 
five. 
In the next chapter we will more closely explore different theories of taxation, the 
rationale for government interventions into the economy and the economic reasons for rather 
substansive size of the public sector in developed economies. Moreover, we will briefly 
comment basic properties of tax systems and tax efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 As such impediments we can see different laguages, different norms and legal practises and also the fact that 
people in Europe do not migrate that much as in the United States. 
37 Tax competition is concept where regions or countries compete to attract firms and capital to settle down in 
their region or country. 
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2 Introduction to the Theory of Taxation and Tax 
Systems 
 
Taxes and taxation systems are present in the everyday life of all human beings and 
they affect our decisions concerning work and labor supply, savings, education, consumption, 
retirement etc. Also on the macroeconomic level taxes affect very broad spectrum of subjects 
from level and structure of investment to allocation of governmental resources into public 
goods and other services provided by the government. Tax policy may also reflect the 
elements of national culture and the values of society other than equity or individualism. 
In this section we at first briefly review different theories of taxation, then we will 
focus on the reasons why the government intervenes and why the magnitude of the public 
sector is that sizable and varies accross the countries.  
 
2.1 Different Theories of Taxation 
 
 
During the time there evolved several tax theories which explain the creation and 
purpose of taxes and we should now investigate them more closely. Two main ones are the 
benefit theory of taxation and the ability to pay theory and we shortly review them. Among 
other theories we can classify economic surplus theory38, utilitarism or ideas of Rawls or 
Nozick,39 however we will not review them here. 
2.1.A The Benefit Theory 
 
According to its term this theory argues that each individual should contribute to the 
state system in accordance with the benefits he derives from the state. Taxes therefore should 
reflect the demand of individuals for public services (e.g. the protection, health service etc.).  
The critiques of this theory claim that it requires to measure values which are hardly 
measurable and it is incompatible with social justice and fairness.40 Thus this theory could be 
applied solely to some specific taxes, such as the fuel tax (consumption tax on fuels). The 
revenue from this tax should be used for developing of the quality of roads and highways, 
                                                 
38 See Trotman-Dickenson (1996), p. 115 for detailed explanation. 
39 For detailed description of those theories and ideas as well as for further references see e.g. chapter three in 
Barr (2004), pp. 42-63. 
40 See e.g. Trotman-Dickenson (1996), pp. 115-117 for the discussion. 
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transportation services etc. Therefore there is visible link – those who pay the tax also receive 
benefits from this taxation.41 
2.1.B Ability to Pay Theory 
 
This theory is mostly recognized theory of taxation.42 It tackles the problem of equity 
and social justice and it declares that individuals should contribute to the system according to 
their means. Hence those in need of state benefits do not have to, according to this theory, 
contribute to the system heavily.   
As an example of the tax which would be explained by this theory we could mention 
for instance progressive income taxation. The taxpayers with lower income would pay lower 
taxes and the problem of social justice is therefore settled.43 
  
2.2 The Rationale for State Intervention 
 
We have shortly reviewed theories of taxation which try to explain how the taxation 
was introduced and who should pay different taxes. Let us now focus on the reasons why 
taxes are needed and why the public sector engages from one third to over one half of the 
whole economies of the developed countries as we have seen in the previous section. At first 
we should focus on the roles of government and then we would investigate when the 
government (state) should intervene into the market. 
2.2.A Roles of Government 
 
According to Musgrave44 the government has three functions on the field of 
economy45 in the democratic society. With the stabilization function the government should 
maintain stable prices and employment. This could be done by using the monetary and fiscal 
policy.  
The allocation function should ensure that the goods and services are allocated in 
sufficient quantities for the consumers. That could be done through the market (state should 
solely supervise and enforce laws) or via government provisioning 
                                                 
41 See Voorhees (2005), pp. 90-91 for detailed discussion of these examples. 
42 See e.g. Trotman-Dickenson (1996), pp. 117-118. 
43 See Voorhees (2005), pp. 90-91 for details. 
44 Originally in Musgrave (1939), taken from Voorhees (2005) pp. 88-90. 
45 Note that these are not functions on the political field. There would evidently be different functions of the 
government. 
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The most discussed and controversial function is the distribution of wealth. The 
level of redistribution varies greatly among countries and it is highly connected to the notion 
of fairness and equity. 
2.2.B Market Failures – Rationale for Government Activity 
 
According to the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics the market 
provision of goods is superior than the public provision.46 However the assumptions of those 
theorems are restrictive and if those assumptions are not satisfied the private market provision 
is not efficient. We should now focus exactly on those situations, when the market provision 
is not Pareto-efficient and when the state intervention should be necessary – those conditions, 
when the governmental activity is rational, are called market failures. Below we only shortly 
review the most known market failures.47 
Several reasons in some industries could cause that there exist relatively few firms 
with a large share of the market. Therefore there has to be control of abuse of dominant 
position (regulation, state intervention), since these firms are more liable to that kind of 
unethical behaviour. 
Public Goods are goods with special properties which ensure that their provision by 
the market would be insufficient or they would not be provided at all. Those properties are 
non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption.48 Typical examples which would ensure 
both of these properties are, inter alia, national defense of a country, lighthouse for ships on 
the sea or a system of justice. 
Situations when the action of individual or a firm affects other individuals or firms 
and the latter are not compensated for that actions are called externalities (negative or 
positive). One of the most wide-spread solution to externalities is regulation or imposing 
penalties and fees (rewarding for positive externalities).  
The literature mentions also incomplete markets (e.g. the market for loans and 
insurance) and information faiures as market failures.  
                                                 
46 See e.g. Stiglitz (2000), pp. 60-61. 
47 For more detailed description of market failures and their exercise in practise see e.g. Stiglitz (2000) pp. 76-86. 
48 Obviously those properties are usually not satisfied fully, therefore pure public goods are rare in the real 
world. Most of the public goods have characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability to some degree and 
they are called impure public goods. See Trogen (2005) pp.169-205 for full characteristics of impure public 
goods and other specifications such as excludable public good or congestible public good (the assumption of 
non-rivality is violated). 
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2.2.C Another State Interventions  
 
The state involvement in the situation of merit goods is based on the assumption 
that the individual may not act in his own best interest, even if he has all the necesarry 
information. The typical merit goods where the state involvement urges individuals to 
consume them are seat belts in the cars or elementary compulsory education.49  
Redistribution of income to the needy or we could use the term equity is another 
situation when the government intervenes and thus uses taxes. There are two types of equity – 
horizontal and vertical equity. The former one is rather easily accepted and requires that there 
should be equal treatment of those who are in all relevant aspects the same. These relevant 
aspects could be understood as gender, age, ethnical or religious conviction etc. In majority of 
cases this horizontal equity is satisfied across developed countries. 
However vertical equity is much more complex and complicated issue which 
depends mainly on the normative perception to what extend the redistribution should take 
place. It is essential to claim that the state involvement in such situations is not approved by 
everyone and it depends on the normative judgements of each individual. 
 
2.3 The Size of the Government 
 
As it was mentined in the previous section, the size of the government grew 
significantly throughout 20th century in developed and also in most of the developing 
countries. In Figure 2.1 you can see total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP for OECD 
countries in years 2000 and 2006. Remeber also the Table 1.1 from previous chapter. Note 
that on average the size of the public sector which could be approximated by the total tax 
revenue50 exceeds 35% in OECD countries and it could extend even beyond 50% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 In Stiglitz (2000), p. 87. 
50 Evidently this is sort of simplification, since government has certain other tools how to obtain additional 
revenue (e.g. budget deficit, seignorage etc.) and thus the size of public sector could be greater or minor. 
  18
Figure 2.1: Total Tax Revenue as % of GDP 
 
Source: OECD (2008) 
 
Since the previous chapter focused mainly on political and social reasons for the size 
of the government and its growth in the 20th century we should  explore the economic reasons 
and explanations of such a growth.  
The pattern of the growth was evident in the first half of the 20th century and after 
the World War II, since 1970’s the pattern has been much more varied. Countries as United 
States, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy experienced decline in the share of government 
consumption in GDP. On the other hand, Austria, Finland, France, Norway, Portugal and 
other countries experienced the opposite and the share of government consumption in GDP 
has grown significantly.51 
To explain the size of the government in the developed countries the equation (1) 
could be used:52 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1     1g p y N k mη δ α η δ φ• • • • • •= + + − + − + + +
where the variables with the dots represent the growth rate of the given variable.53  
The explained variable g is the share of government spending in the agregate real 
output. Right-hand-side explanatory variables: N stands for population size, p is the relative 
                                                 
51 See Borcherding et al. (2004), pp. 77-79 for detailed describtion of the above mentioned development and for 
exact figures or see Table 1.1 in this thesis. 
52 It was firstly derived and used in Borcherding (1977). 
53 More formally the notation should be 
x
x
∂
, where x denotes particular variable. 
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price of government services (to all other goods), y stands for mean income, k is the ratio of 
median to mean income and m stands for a set of political control variables.  
If we take a look on the parametrs, η  represents the price elasticity of demand for 
government consumption, α  is the degree of publicness of the output of the government 
sector,δ  represents the income elasticity of demand, φ  is the set of elasticities for the effect 
of the various political controls on demand. This form is useful for estimating and discussing 
the effects of various variables on the real government size and its growth.54 The vast 
literature evaluate the effects of those different variables on the size of the government sector 
and we will discuss those factors in more details.  
2.3.A Income Effect and Wagner’s Law 
 
German economist Adolph Wagner, who lived mainly in the 19th century and on the 
beggining of the 20th century, has investigated the expanding state expenditures and he 
observed empirical regularities in the growth of public enterprises as individual economies 
develop. These regularities were not only in the absolute terms but also in the relative portion 
of the public sector to the whole economy – this relationship is thus called „Wagner’s Law” 
or “Law of increasing state activity”.55 Thus we could regard the public sector services as 
some kind of luxury good, where its consumption rise with income of the particular country 
not only in absolute values but also in reative terms. Thus the income elasticity of demand for 
government services would be higher than unity. 
Wagner believed that the increasing expenditures are associated with traditional state 
activity such as defense and maintaining law and order as well as with the implementation of 
newer activities: more emphasis on the education, welfare services and incrasing use of 
government regulations.56  Wagner stated that the growth of real income would strengthen the 
relative expansion of income-elastic cultural and welfare expenditures. These areas such as 
culture and education would be in general more efficiently produced by the public producers 
than by the private ones.57 Wagner also noted that there has to be upper limit for the 
proportion of government growth, but he did not specify it exactly.58 
 
                                                 
54 In Borcherding et al. (2004), p. 80. 
55 In Peacock & Scott (2000), pp. 1-2. 
56 Originally in Wagner (1911), taken from Peacock & Scott (2000), pp. 2-3. 
57 In Henrekson (1993), p. 407. 
58 See Peacock & Scott (2000), p. 3. 
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Review of Literature on Wagner’s Law 
There exist a vast literature which investigate the relation of economic development 
and the growth of public sector (government activities). Therefore we will mention only few 
of them and study whether these studies confirm Wagner’s Law or reject it. We also have to 
keep in mind that different authors used different specifications of the model, they used 
different measures of government59, most of them omit to include public utilities 
(enterprises)60 and the usage of independent variables also differs among studies. Different 
problems in the econometric techniques may arise as well and they would be shortly 
discussed below. 
Earlier studies61 do mostly confirm the Wagner’s Law on their chosen samples of 
countries and time periods. These studies estimated either ( )1δ −  term as is specified in the 
Equation (1). Thus if this elasticity is significantly greater than 0, the hypothesis of Wagner’s 
Law could be confirmed. Or the studies estimated directly the income elasticity δ  in that case 
if this elasticity is significantly greater than 1, they confirmed Wagner’s Law hypothesis.62  
Different Problems of Estimations 
However, if we have a closer look on these studies which focused on time series 
rather than cross-section data, we discover that the problem of non-stationarity of the data 
arises. It means that one of the basic assumption of time-series analysis that all regressors are 
either deterministic or stationary random variables is violated.63 In most earlier studies that 
assumption is not met and thus the standard OLS regression brings inconsistent estimates if 
the integrated dependent variable is not co-integrated with one of the regressors.64 Therefore 
those studies which omitted the problem of non-stationarity brought spurious regressions, 
where there was high level of R2 but very low Durbin-Watson statistics and the estimated 
coefficient are not efficient.65  
                                                 
59 From very narrow sence excluding transfers and defense expenditures to broad definitions where all 
expenditures are included. See Peacock & Scott (2000) p. 5. for the discussion about different inclusion of 
different definitions of government. 
60 See the critical discussion concerning these omissions and why it could have been actually beneficial for the 
authors regarding their results in Peacock & Scott (2000), pp. 10-13. 
61 See e.g. Goffman & Mahar (1971) or Bird (1971). 
62 E.g. Bird (1971) examined four developed countries (Germany, Sweden, Japan and United Kingdom) and he 
found the income elasticity ranging from 1.02 to 3.90 in different subperiods. Thus he also confirmed the 
Wagner’s Law. 
63 E.g. in Stock & Watson (1988), p. 165. 
64 In Henrekson (1993), p. 412. 
65 This phenomenon of spurious regression was at first recognized by  Yule (1926) and elaborated by Granger & 
Newbold (1974) where several Monte Carlo simulations on spurious regressions were done. 
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To overcome this problem recent studies test whether the time-series data are 
stationary or not.66 When the individual series are non-stationary, the authors then ussually 
test the joint cointegration of time series data. If the cointegration is present then it is possible 
to test Granger-causality.67 Then ussually if it was found that income Granger-causes the size 
of the government, the Wagner’s Law was confirmed in such situations. The results of these 
recent studies are not that convincing and the hypothesis of Wagner’s Law is not always 
accepted. For example Henrekson68 examined data for swedish economy for the period 1861-
1990 and he found that the government spending and real income per capita are not 
cointegrated, although both these variables dramatically rose during that time period. Thus he 
concludes that the growth of public sector cannot be explained per se by the growth of real 
income.69   
On the other hand, Chang in his study70  explores three emerging economies (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand) and three developed economies (USA, United Kingdom and Japan) 
on time-series data over the period 1951-1996. He estimates five different versions of 
Wagner’s Law (different specifications of the model) and he concludes that, with exception of 
Thailand, there exist a long-run relationship between income and government spending for 
sample countires. Furthermore, in most cases for selected countries (again with exception of 
Thailand) Granger-causality confirmed the validity of Wagner’s Law in these countries. 
Reversed Causality ? 
In the recent literature the issue of reversed causality is also discussed and 
examined. These studies focus on the influence of the size of the government sector on the 
economic growth of a particular country. Most of the studies concluded that larger size of the 
government sector lowers economic growth.71  
For the purpose of estimating the Wagner’s Law it is important to emphasize that in 
a single equation model the income coefficient ( )1δ −  could be overestimated, since it would 
capture the reversed causality as well. However, Borcherding et al. on their data set showed 
                                                 
66 That could be done using the unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) etc.) for the application of 
this test in practice see section 6.2.A of this thesis. 
67 See Borcherding et al. (2004), pp. 82-83 for more detailed description of this approach. For the practical usage 
of this approach  testing the Wagner’s Law see e.g. Henrekson (1993) or Chang (2002). 
68 In Henrekson (1993). 
69 Ibid. pp. 412-413. 
70 In Chang (2002). 
71 See e.g. Fölster & Henrekson (1999) pp. 347-354 for the results of their regressions for the OECD countries. 
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on the system with growth equation added, that the results would not change dramatically.72 
Therefore they concluded that Wagner’s Law is still valid even with the inclusion of the 
reversed causality and growth equation.   
To summarize this discussion concerning Wagner’s Law one have to be aware of the 
fact that earlier studies often did not include the problem of non-stationarity of the data and 
thus estimates of these regressions were inconsistent. Recent studies do not give that 
straightforward results on the confirmation of Wagner’s Law. Another problems may arise 
with the specifications of the model as well as with the unclear causality as was described 
above. Despite those limitations and traps we still can conclude that the growth of the public 
sector in developed economies could be partially explained by the Wagner’s Law. 
2.3.B Baumol Effect 
 
Baumol and Bowen in their book73 and one year later Baumol74 in his seminal paper 
focused on the productivity in different employments (sectors) and the productivity lag of 
some employments. The model introduced by Baumol was a model of two types of economic 
activities, one of them being technologically progressive in which innovations, capital 
accumulation, and large economies of scale all make for the cumulative rise in productivity 
and output per worker. On the other hand, the second group of economic activity allows only 
for sporadic productivity growth.75 As an example of the second group Baumol states for 
example teaching or music live performance.  
 One of the conclusions of Baumol’s model of unbalanced productivities was that 
while the productivity per worker relatively rises in one sector and wages rise in uniform pace 
in both sectors,76 then relative costs in the nonprogressive sector must ineviteably rise.77 In 
consecutive discussion the cost pressures in some sectors were thus called “Baumol’s cost 
disease“ and it was identified that most of the public sector employments would belong to the 
group of employments with productivity lag.78  
                                                 
72 See Borcherding et al (2004), pp. 92-95 for exact results of the estimation of the system of those two equations 
and for the discussion. 
73 In Baumol & Bowen (1967). 
74 In Baumol (1967). 
75 See Baumol (1967), pp. 415-416 for the assuptions of the model. 
76 That is due to the fact that if wages would rise only in one sector, the employees of the sector where wages do 
not rise would tend to leave their employment and move to the sector with rising wages and new equilibrium 
wages would be determined. 
77 In Baumol (1967), pp. 419-420.  
78 The examples could be schooling, health care, police, state bureaucracy etc. which are typically public sector 
employments. 
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In comparism to the private sector the productivity growth is thus expected to be 
lower in the public sector. Therefore the relative cost of output of public sector would rise in 
time to all other goods produced by private sector. In addition if the demand for government 
services is price inelastic79 the rise in price of government services would thus result in only 
relatively small decrease in the demand for the government services. Therefore the aggregate 
expenditure on public sector would rise in time due to this fact. Baumol effect is rather 
accepted in the literature and there are studies which confirm this effect of inelastic demand 
for government services on the growth of public sector and we would shortly review some of 
them.  
Empirical Evidence for Baumol Effect 
The first condition of the rise of relative cost of government services is confirmed 
for example by Ferris and West80 on the U.S. data or by Borcherding et al.81 on the data of 
twenty OECD countries. They found that from 1970 to 1997 the average annual relative rate 
of growth of price index of government services to the GDP deflator was 0.8 percent. 
Then the necessary condition of Baumol effect to take place is the price inelastic 
demand for government services. In equation (1) this could be captured by 1 0η− < < 82 thus 
making it 0 ( 1) 1η< + < . This relation concerning elasticity of demand for government 
services is also validated by the studies in literature. For example Deacon in his study83 
estimated the value of elasticities for different public expenditure cathegories on 50 years of 
data for the city of Seattle. The estimated values of price elasticities of demand ranged in most 
of the cathegories from -0.4 to -0.7 which would satisfy the condition of inelastic demand. 
Borcherding et al.84 found that for their sample of OECD countries the elasticity of 
demand for government services (η ) is insignificantly different from zero and thus it 
confirms the hypothesis of very price inelastic demand for government services. 
While we present these results, we have to be aware of the fact that this effect should 
be estimated with the system of equations (demand and supply equation) rather than with only 
demand equation. However, results with usage of simultaneous equations mostly confirm 
                                                 
79 That means that the price elasticity of demand for government services satisfies this condition 
1G G
G G
D P
P D
∂ ∗ <∂ , where DG  is demand for government services and PG is their price. 
80 See Ferris & West (1999), p. 310 for the results. 
81 In Borcherding et al (2004), p. 102. 
82 That is due to the fact that price elasticity of demand is negative and is then mostly used in absolute terms. 
83 In Deacon (1973), on p. 190 could be found the results of the estimated elasticities for cathegories such as 
municipal courts, police, libraries etc. 
84 In Borcherding et al (2004), p. 87. 
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those results mentined above.85 Thus we can conclude that size of the public sector and its rise 
in the last century could be partialy explained by the Baumol effect. 
2.3.C Median Voter Theory 
 
In the theory of public choice we can find another explanation for the size and the 
growth of the public sector. It concerns the voting and electoral rules as well as the 
redistribution of governmental revenue among people and inequality of income. According to 
Persson and Tabellini86 the pure majority rule is defined by these three assumptions: direct 
democracy, sincere voting and open agenda.  
If in addition we put another restrictions such as that the preferences of individuals 
are single-peaked87 and we are in one-dimensional issue we get a Condorcet winner88 
coinciding with median-ranked bliss point. Obviously these restrictions are very limiting and 
there are plenty of situations when the assumptions are violated and the median position does 
not have to be decisive.  
Violation of Assumptions 
The assumption of single-peaked preferences could be violated easily89 and then this 
voting could lead into cycles as was firstly recognized by Marquis de Condorcet in 1785. It 
was also proved90 that if the preferences are not singe-peaked then with the majority voting 
rule the person responsible for the agenda setting (the open agenda condition is also violated) 
could lead the outcome of the voting to any point in the issue space he chooses. This could 
lead to unpredictable results and it brings incentive to manipulate the process of voting to the 
advantage of certain person or group. Moreover, voting is ussually based on a multi-
dimensional issue. However, in that case there also exist situations which ensure that the 
equilibrium point under majority rule will be median in all directions.91 
If we relax the condition of direct democracy and we have a closer look on the case 
of representative democracy the situation gets far more complicated. In the bi-party political 
system the median voter position is more likely to be decisive. If we focus on the multi-party 
                                                 
85 Ibid., p. 81. 
86 In Persson and Tabellini (2000) p. 21. 
87 Or equivalently if the utilities af individuals are quasiconcave. 
88 Condorcet winner is defined as that kind of policy which cannot be outvoted in any pairwise comparism – see 
e.g. Mueller (2003), pp. 147-150 for detailed elaboration of this condition. 
89 Individual could prefer no provision of that particular public good (e.g. education) to little provision, but from 
certain level he would prefer more provision of that good to no provision. 
90 See McKelvey (1976) for the proof. 
91 See Mueller (2003) pp.87-93. 
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system, the position of the median voter is weaker and does not have to be decisive. However 
if the entry costs for a new political party to enter the political competition are high enough, 
and other assumptions hold, the median position cas still be decisive.92 
From this short analysis it is straightforward that the median position of a voter is 
very important and political parties give attention to the requirements of the median voter in 
order to increase the probability of winning the election. Thus if median voter is decisive or at 
least important for the policy implementation, the tax rates and accordingly the level of 
redistribution are to some extend set in accordance with the median voter position.   
Inequality of Income and Median Voter 
In most of the economies the income distribution is skewed to the right and thus the 
median position is below the mean income position ( My y≺ ).93 This implies relative 
redistribution effect: redistribution increases with the income inequality. From these findings 
we could conclude that the median voter favors higher level of redistribution and thus it 
influences the size of the government. 
In our Equation (1) the effect of inequality of median to mean income is explained 
by the variable k. The literature also examines these effects of median income and the ratio of 
mean to median  income on the size of government. However, the results are not evident and 
the relationship is not confirmed each time. Meltzer and Richard,94 inter alia,  have developed 
their general equlibrium model and they showed that the size of government is determined by 
the welfare-maximizing choice of a decisive individual (in majority rule that would be the 
median voter). They also presented the supporting tests of median voter hypothesis on U.S. 
data.95 Mueller and Murrell96 in their sample of 24 OECD countries give some weak support 
for the above mentioned hypothesis. Thus the evidence in the literature does not have such 
strong support, however the growth of the public sector probably could be partially explained 
by this phenomenon. 
                                                 
92 See Feddersen et al. (1990) and their model of set of potential candidates choosing whether or not to enter the 
political contest in the presence of entry costs in a singledimensional space, they also mention limitation of this 
model and other assumptions made on pp. 1012-1014. 
93 See Atkinson et al. (1995) for confirmation of this fact in OECD countries. 
94 In Meltzer & Richard (1981). 
95 In Meltzer & Richard (1981), p. 923. 
96 In Mueller and Murrell (1986), pp. 134-135. 
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2.3.D Other Factors Influencing the Size of the Government  
 
These factors that could influence the size of the government are captured by the set 
of political control variables – m in Equation (1). Borcherding et al.97 focus on two particular 
approaches how recent studies evaluate the influence of political control variables on the size 
of the public sector. We shortly review those approaches and comment them. 
First approach is used to evaluate the role of intrest groups and lobbying as well as 
the electoral rules. Some intrest groups may have an incentive to transform the size of the 
government and thus gain an additional support. Among those intrest groups we can find 
segments of population which are not really organized such as older or poor people. Example 
of more organized intrest groups could be the farmers or labor unions. We cannot forget the 
employees of the public sector – those people would mostly have an incentive to vote for 
larger government in order not to lose their employment.   
Closely connected with issue of intrest groups is in the majority voting system 
trading with the votes – logrolling. In democratic societies and in the parliamentary bodies of 
democratic countries all around the world, the trading with votes is prohibited by law. 
However, on various issues the value of the vote differ for different people and politicans. 
Therefore, some might exchange the votes in issues they are not intrested and they might gain 
the support of their „trading partners” in more appealing issues for them. This will bring 
benefits to the traders, however it will lower the benefits of those, who did not particiapte in 
this horse-trading and as a consequence this can lower the welfare of a society as a whole and 
obviously increase the public expenditures. Logrolling therefore emphazise the role of 
lobbying and could lead to excessive governmental spending.98  
Second Approach 
Second approach emphasizes changes in costs of raising funds for the government. 
Since the participation of woman and the urbanization of the working population has grown 
significantly over the last decades, the costs of raising funds for the government decreased. 
On the other hand, the rise of self-employed people had contradictory effect on these costs.  
In the study of Borcherding et al. all those other factors were also found significant 
and thus they were evaluated to have an influence on the size of the government as well.99 
 
                                                 
97 In Borcherding et al. (2004), p. 85. 
98 See e.g. Tullock (1959) for the introduction to the discussion about logrolling. 
99 See Borcherding et al. (2004), pp. 87-91 for exact results of their regressions. 
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We have shortly explored the main determinants of the size and growth of public 
sector activities from the economic point of view. All these determinants have support in 
economic theory and in addition there are studies which empirically estimate and confirm 
their validity in different countries and on different data sets as was very briefly presented in 
this section. To conclude our discussion about taxation theories and tax systems we should 
shortly discuss the latter and explore determinants of different tax systems. 
 
2.4 Properties of Tax Systems and Their Efficiency 
 
 
We have seen that the state sector needs funds to enable the interventions into the 
economy. These funds are evidently collected mainly from taxes and we should now focus on 
the tax systems and their efficiency. 
The tax systems around the world are compound of a variety of different taxes. 
There are some taxes which are basically the same in different countries and teritories. On the 
other hand, there are certain specific features and differences for each country. We would 
solely mention the basic types of taxation and taxes and then we will focus on the issue of 
optimal taxation and tax systems. 
In developed economies we could divide taxes into three broad cathegories which 
are100: 
• Direct taxation (taxes on income) – mainly we can emphasise the income tax of 
individuals, corporate income tax, compulsory social security contributions etc. 
 
• Indirect taxation (taxes on consumption) – into this group we can include taxes like 
value added tax (or any other sales tax), excise taxes, customs duties and usually also 
environmental taxation which is applied more and more often. 
 
• Taxes on capital – among those we can incorporate for example capital gain tax or 
inheritance tax. 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 This division is based on Trotman-Dickenson (1996), pp. 125-126. 
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Figure 2.2: Income Taxes Revenue as % of GDP 
 
Source: OECD (2008). 
 
Evidently there exist a vast number of other taxes which were not mentioned here 
and most of them should also fall into one of these three cathegories. In Figures 2.2 and 2.3 
we can see taxes on income of individuals and corporations and taxes on goods and services 
as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries respectively for years 2000 and 2006. Note that 
the income taxation figure do not include social security contributions. It is straightforward 
that on average in OECD countries the income taxation is little more significant than the 
consumption taxation.  
 
Figure 2.3: Consumption Taxes Revenue as % of GDP 
Soure: OECD (2008). 
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We will not concentrate more on various tax systems and their properties.101  Rather 
in the concluding part of this section we would focus on the issue of optimal taxation and on 
the recommendations on that issue stemming from the economic literature. 
2.4.A Optimal Taxation 
 
The issue of tax efficiency is higly discussed in the literature. By introducing taxes 
into the economy there is, in most cases, also introduced inefficiency which accompanies 
them.102 The introduction of most of the taxes brings both income and substitution effect. The 
distortionary effect of taxes arise when they influence the optimal behaviour of economic 
subjects and that is caused due to the substitution effect. Therefore most of the taxes cause 
welfare losses (dead weight losses) and the taxes which should be most efficient should 
minimize those welfare losses and thus minimize the substitution effect.   
The issue of optimal taxes was at first explored by Ramsey103 and since then the topic 
was many times reviewed and complemented. Ramsey in his paper focused mainly on the 
commodity taxation. His results of the model implies to have taxation with least distortionary 
effect we need different commodities tax at different tax rates depending on the elasticities of 
demand and supply for those commodities. Thus the commodities with less elastic demand 
should be taxed more and that would cause the substitution effect to be minimized.104 
Obviously these results do not take into account the redistribution issue as well as 
administrative and political costs of this setting.105  
Income Taxation and Broader Perspective 
The theory of optimal income taxation was elaborated for example by British economist 
James Mirrlees. To put it very briefly he came with the thought that is sometimes reffered as 
Mirrlees solution.106 He argued that the progressive system with different bands and tax rates 
is very inefficient and the tax revenue from its introduction are not that high. He proposed the 
                                                 
101 For extended discussion see e.g. Trotman-Dickenson (1996), pp. 125-134. 
102 If we take into account the taxation of negative externalities, then there is on the other hand the rise of 
efficiency present since the negative externality is diminished. Another tax which does not introduce inefficiency 
into the system is uniform flat tax for everyone (poll tax). The budget constrain of everyone is thus lowered, but 
this tax does not influence the behaviour of economic agents, the substitution effect is not present and thus it 
does not bring inefficiencies into the system. On the other hand, these taxes are in controversy with vertical 
equity and the issue of redistribution. 
103 In Ramsey (1927). 
104 See Ramsey (1927), pp. 58-60 for implications of his model. 
105 See Holcombe (2004), pp.144-145 for further discussion about efficient commodity taxation and inclusion of 
administrative and political costs. 
106 See Mirrlees (1971) for detailed information about his model and the way he derived to the presented results. 
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tax system which would be linear (flat tax rate) with one exeption and that is the person 
(company) who earns the most in the society.  
This person (company) would have, on the contrary with the system of progressive 
taxation, a tax benefit. He would have a lower tax rate than the others or even zero tax rate. 
That would acctually stimulate others for higher economic activity and it would be like a 
competition to reach the first place and have more beneficial tax rate. The budgetary revenue 
would not suffer because higher economic activity of others would create more tax base and 
therefore it would, according to the theory, mean more revenue for the budget, eventhough the 
person with highest income will contribute less to the system. 
The theory of optimal taxation is further investegated for example by Joel Slemrod.107 In 
his paper he focused on the issue of optimal taxation from broader perspective adding more 
features and making the issue complex. He concludes that although in theory the optimal 
taxation was described, it is difficult to implement them in practice. Thus to the theory the 
administrative and political costs should be incorporated and also more complex analysis 
should be implemented.  
2.4.B Efficient Tax Systems 
 
As was discussed above, the tax systems are compound of various taxes, which need 
to be collected to provide funds for the government interventions and actions. Since the 
redistribution issue plays important role in creating taxes and setting their rates, the efficiency 
issue of particular taxes is in general less fundamental for policymakers. However there are 
some generally accepted properties which an efficient tax system should satisfy. Among five 
generally accepted properties of efficient tax system we can find economic efficiency, 
administrative simplicity, flexibility, political responsibility and fairness.108 
These properties are generally accepted, although current tax systems do not 
perfectly reflect them. Probably most discussed is the interpretation of fairnesss. As was 
mentioned above, the controversy stems from different perceptions of vertical equity. Thus 
while certain level of redistribution could be understand as fair for particular group of 
individuals, it could be perceived as extremely unfair for different group of individuals.  
                                                 
107 See Slemrod (1990) for detailed discussion. 
108 For details see e.g.  Stiglitz (2000) pp. 456-469, or originally Musgrave (1959). 
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Reducing Political Costs 
Other properties are not that discussed in the literature, however tax systems 
significantly differ in reflecting them. Some politicans in particular countries pay more 
attention to these properties, however in other countries the tax systems are considerably 
complex, not very transparent and thus the flexibility of a tax system is limited to a great 
extend as well. These deviations from the properties of efficient tax systems are caused by 
several reasons. We can mention, inter alia, the influence of intrest groups and their rent-
seeking behaviour, logrolling, political process109 etc. Since the tax systems are produced by 
the political process they could deviate a lot from the optimal tax structures.110 
To prevent or at least considerably reduce the political costs the discussion about 
fiscal policy of government and setting the tax rates, level of redistribution, size of 
government services and public deficit etc. is in progress. For example Buchanan proposes the 
creation of fiscal constitution which sets the basic rules for tax structures and  which could be 
modified only with substantial concensus.111 
This would result into considerably more difficult situation for lobby groups to 
change the tax system and thus rent-seeking would be reduced as well as political costs 
associated with that.112 
 
2.4.C Concluding Remarks 
 
More detailed and further discussion about the efficiency of taxes and tax systems is 
above the scope of this thesis. However even from this short excursion into this problem it is 
straightforward that tax systems in present times do differ a lot among countries, are complex, 
complicated, do include administrative and political costs and at least to some extend do not 
reflect the recommendations from the literature. Thus they are more inefficient and produce 
considerable welfare losses.   
In the next chapters we will concentrate on the main topic of this thesis – the Laffer 
curve. At first we would examine the theory behind Laffer curve and the empirical evidence 
                                                 
109 By this the author means various political failures arising from real political systems such as compromises 
that have to be made in order to at least partially satisfy other players in the political environment, the political 
terms and the desire of politicans to be reelected to the office etc. 
110 See the discussion in Buchanan (1975). 
111 See Buchanan (1987), mainly his chapter 18 (pp. 267-280) called Fiscal Policy Constitutionally Considered 
for further discussion and his detailed proposals. 
112 In Holcombe (2004), p. 143. 
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for that phenomenon in the literature. Then we focus on Laffer curve for corporate income 
taxation and present our models.  
  33
3 Laffer Curve Theory 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters the state sector was rising significantly in last 
century. Evidently the government needs more resources to be able to finance its growing 
activities. Therefore it is appropriate to examine the relationship between tax rates and tax 
revenue and see whether it is possible at all times to increase the tax rates in order to increase 
corresponding tax revenue. The Laffer curve tries to give some solutions to this problem and 
considers the relationship between tax rates and revenue to be nonlinear. At first we would 
examine some theory behind the Laffer curve, then we would explore the literature 
concerning this topic. And then in the following chapters we will provide some estimates of 
Laffer curve and Laffer effects. 
 
3.1 The Theory Behind the Laffer Curve 
 
The concept of nonlinear relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue of 
government is well-known and was described several times in the history prior to Arthur 
Laffer explanation. Let us shortly review some of those thoughts on the relationship of tax 
rate and revenue before we review the introduction to the theory. 
3.1.A Review of Thoughts 
  
In 14th century the Muslim phiposopher Ibn Khaldum wrote:  
 
It should be known that at the beginning of the dynasty taxation yields a large revenue from 
small assessments. At the end of the dynasty taxation yields a small revenue from large 
assessments.113   
 
Another remark was made in the parliament of the United States. The then politican 
Edmund Burke in 1774 argued against overtaxation of the American colonists by saying: 
 
Your scheme yields no revenue. It yields nothing but discontent, disorder, disobedience, and 
such is the state of America, that after wading up to your eyes in blood, you could only end  
                                                 
113 That originally appeared in: Khaldum: The Muqqadimah, the quote was taken from Laffer (2004), pp. 1-2. 
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just where you began; that is, to tax where no revenue is to be found ...114  
 
We cannot forget on the legacy of Adam Smith, who in his seminal work wrote on 
the issue of commodity tax (sales tax in the United States): 
 
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing consumption of the taxed commodities and sometimes 
by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government than what 
might be drawn from moderate taxes.115  
 
Another known economist Jean-Baptiste Say was concerned with high taxes and 
their influence on the revenue by shifting output. He wrote:  
 
Taxation, pushed to the extreme, has the lamentable effect of impoverishing the individual, 
without enriching the state... The diminution of the demand must be followed by diminution of 
the supply of production; and, consequently, of the articles liable to taxation. Thus the 
taxpayer is abridged of his enjoyments, the producer of his profits, and the public exchequer 
of its receipts.116   
 
In 1844 academic Dupuit described the relationship rather accurately by saying: 
 
If a tax is gradually increased from zero up to the point where it becomes prohibitive, its yield 
is at first nil, then increases by small stages until it reaches a maximum, after which it 
gradually declines until it becomes zero again.117 
 
We cannot forget to mention Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises who also 
perceived the threat of high taxes on revenue: 
 
The true crux of the taxation issue is to be seen in the paradox that the more tax increase, the 
more they undermine the market economy and concomitantly the system of taxation itself... 
                                                 
114 This quotation taken from Blinder (1981), p. 83. 
115 Originally in Smith (1776), p.78; the quote taken from Yu Hsing (1996), pp. 395-396. 
116 Originally in Say (1834), pp.453-454; the partial quotation was taken from Barlett (2003), p.3. 
117 This quotation taken from Atkinson & Stern (1981), p.43. 
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Every specific tax, as well as a nation’s whole tax system, becomes self-defeating above a 
certain height of rates.118 
Thus you can see that the relationship was described several times in the history. 
However, the trade-off between tax rates and tax revenue received its name after professor 
Arthur Laffer. He used this relatioship in his classes and he illustrated it in December 1974 on 
a dinner with the then professor at the University of Chicago – Jude Wanniski, chief of staff 
to president Gerald Ford - Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheyney deputy of Rumsfeld at that 
time. According to Wanniski119 at Two Continents Restaurant at the Washington hotel at 
Washington D.C. this gathering was discussing proposals for tax increases by president Ford 
named as „WIN” (Whip Inflation Now). During this discussion Artur Laffer is said to 
outlined the curve illustrading the trade-off between tax rates and tax revenue on his 
napkin.120  
Thus the trade-off was named by Wanniski the Laffer curve on the basis of this 
occurence and since then the Laffer curve is used and known term for the relationship 
between tax rates and tax revenue. 
3.1.B The Theory 
 
According to Laffer the basic idea behind the relationship between tax rates and tax 
revenue would be that change in the tax rate is associated by two effects on revenue: the 
arithmetic effect (tax rate effect) and the economic effect (quantity effect).121 The arithmetic 
effect is straightforward and it states that with decrease of the tax rate the tax revenue would 
decrease by the relative amount of the decrase in the rate for the same tax base. This effect 
would obviously hold vice versa. 
However, the economic effect goes in the opposite direction to arithmetic effect. The 
economic effect affects the tax base and if the tax rate is reduced than the tax base could 
acctually increase and thus the tax revenue would increase due to this effect. The overall 
effect on the tax revenue thus depends on the prevalence of one of those two effects. 
The presence of these two effects implies that there exist two tax rates that will 
collect the same amount of revenue122 – high tax rate in the prohibitive area on a small tax 
                                                 
118 In Mises (1949), p.734. 
119 See Wanniski (1978). 
120 Although Laffer itself is not aware of the fact that he would use the napkin for the illustration – see Laffer 
(2004), p.1. 
121 In Laffer (2004), pp. 2-3, the terms tax rate effect and quantity effect were used in Becsi (2000). 
122 Obviously except the revenue-maximizing tax rate, which should be an unique tax rate. 
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base and a low tax rate on a large tax base as you can see in Figure 3.1, where the basic Laffer 
curve is depicted. 
Figure 3.1: The Laffer Curve  
 
Source: Laffer (2004) 
3.1.C Laffer Curve for Different Taxes123 
 
Obviously the reasons for economic effect differ for particular taxes. For personal 
income tax the lower tax rate would have direct impact on supply of work, employment and 
indirectly it would influence the output of a given country and thus stimulate the tax base. For 
the income taxation if the tax rate is zero the government would collect no tax revenue, 
irrespective the size of the tax base. The other extreme would be 100% income tax which 
would most probably also generate zero government revenue.124 
For explanation of the Laffer effect in indirect taxation (VAT, sales tax, excise 
duties) we can use the Figure 3.2. On the left-hand-side picture you can see traditional picture 
of linear supply and demand for certain good, where at equilibrium point A there is no tax and 
thus Q* is the quantity produced and correspondingly there would be unique price (P*).  
However with the introduction of taxes the quantity of good produced decreases 
(denoted Q**) and the price including tax increases (denoted P**). The price suppliers 
                                                 
123 The effects for corporate income tax would be in detail described in the following chapter. 
124 Here we abstract from the fact that some people could have positive utility solely from working and thus they 
would supply some hours of work although they would not receive any wage from it. However, economic 
models of labor supply also ussually expect only disutility from working and thus approve our abstraction. Also 
if the tax rate would go beyond the 100%, there must be some higher tax rate that will eventually make him stop 
(see Laffer (1980)). 
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receive is denoted by P**-T. Taken as an example the tax T2 it is simple to derive that 
government revenue would be the area of rectangle  BXP2**P2**-T2  and for T3 and T4 
correspondingly. The triangle ABX is the welfare loss (dead-weight loss) caused by the 
introduction of the T2 tax.  
Figure 3.2: Derivation of the Laffer Curve for Indirect Taxation 
 
Source: Becsi (2000) 
 
The right-hand-side picture is the derivation of Laffer curve for this setting. It is 
evident that the government revenue at point A with 0 tax would be zero. Then they will 
gradually rise up to the point C (where T3 is exercised) and from that revenue-maximazing 
point the revenue would decrease to the point 1 (the tax rate T =100%) or rather to the point 
Y, where the tax rate T could even approach infinity for the indirect taxation. In the case of 
indirect taxation the tax rate grater than 100% is not unfeasible and as was mentioned by 
Blinder for example excise taxes exceeded the rate of 100% many times and places.125  
Obviously this is very simple setting, where the supply and demand curves are linear  
and well-behaved, however even from this simple setting we can see the logic behind the 
Laffer curve for indirect taxation. 
Evidently the Laffer Curve does not give a clear solution whether for example a tax 
cut would result into rise or decline in corrsponding tax revenue. Their response would 
depend upon the existing tax rate, tax system, time period, the ease of evasion of that 
particular tax, prevalence of legal tax loopholes etc.126  Also the revenue-maximizing tax rate 
                                                 
125 In Blinder (1981), p.82. 
126 In Laffer (2004), p.3. 
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does not need to be in the middle (constituing the rate of 50%) and further in the text we will 
see the estimates of that rate for particular taxes that were executed in the literature. 
3.1.D Mathematic Rationale   
To see that the Laffer curve has evidently the mathematical rationale as well we can 
use the Rolle’s Theorem which is as follows:  
If a real-valued function f is continuous on a closed interval [a,b], differentiable on the open 
interval (a,b), and f(a) = f(b), then there is some real number c in the open interval (a,b) such 
that ( ) 0f c′ = .127 
According to the theory we reviewed, we can substitute for (a;b)=(0;1) for personal 
and corporate income taxation and (0;Y), where Y could reach infinity for the indirect 
taxation. Thus the functional values would be f(a) = f(b)=0.  Therefore if the assumptions of 
the Rolle’s Theorem are satisfied we would derive the Laffer curve. Most of the authors do 
not doubt the continuity of Laffer curve, however as you would see later in the text the 
continuity was also challanged 
3.1.E Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate 
 
 
We have seen the economic and mathematic rationale for the Laffer curve and we 
derived the basic shape of this curve. For our further discussion it is important to focus on the 
shape of the Laffer curve and on the revenue-maximizing tax rate, which is depicted by T3 at  
Figure 3.2. In our models we would examine whether the relationship between tax rate and 
tax revenue for corporate income tax does confirm the bell-shape of Laffer curve.  
If the shape is confirmed we would focus on the revenue-maximizing tax rate and try 
to estimate it. The importance of this rate reside in the fact that the area behind the 
maximizing tax rate as is a prohibitive (unefficient) area. As could be derived from Figure 3.2 
as the tax rate rises, the dead-weight loss of the tax increases and since the optimal taxation 
framework declares that the dead-weight loss should be minimized, the desired tax rate should 
                                                 
127 For the proof of this theorem see e.g. Hájková et al. (2000), p.80. 
  39
lie on the upside of the Laffer curve.128 Thus the government should establish such a rate 
which lies on the upside of the Laffer curve (or at the top as the revenue-maximizing tax rate).  
Tax rate exceeding the revenue-maximizing tax rate is irrationally high and could be 
replaced by lower tax rate which would generate the same government revenue with less 
dead-weight loss.129 The main question thus would be what is the level of the revenue-
maximizing tax rate and whether there are some countries which exercise greater tax rate, 
which is inefficient. One of the reasons why this is possible is explained in the next section.  
3.1.F Supply-Side Economics 
 
The Laffer curve relationship of tax rates and corresponding tax revenue is one of 
the major “product” of the supply-side economics. The most known representatives of this 
economic stream were Robert Mundell, Arthur Laffer, Jude Wanniski and others.130 In this 
thesis we wil not evaluate the supply-side economics as such, nor their other findings. We 
would use positive approach to try to estimate and evaluate whether the concept of Laffer 
curve for corporate income taxation is present and see whether we can derive some 
conclusions according the height of the corporate income tax rates. However, at first in the 
rest of this chapter we will further explore the references about the Laffer curve phenomenon 
in the literature. 
3.2 Thoughts on the Laffer Curve 
 
In the following chapter we will review the estimates of the Laffer phenomenon for 
different taxes in the literature. Before that we would focus generally on thoughts on Laffer 
curve which were made in the literature. 
Buchanan and Lee in their paper131 try to give explanation why it is possible to 
encounter the tax rates exceeding the revenue-maximizing tax rates in the reality. They 
also show why political decision makers may find it difficult to escape from that position. 
Among others they assume the politicans to be revenue maximizing.132 Their crutial 
                                                 
128 In Blinder (1981), pp. 81-82, this assumes the fact that the lump-sum tax with no dead-weight loss is not 
possible. 
129 Here we do abstract from the taxation of negative externalities, which could lead to the optimal provision of 
some good or service with imposition of higher tax rate. 
130 See e.g. Barlett (2003) or Lucas (1990) for more thorough elaboration of this stream in economics and also 
for the references to its critiques. 
131 In Buchanan & Lee (1982). 
132 However this is not that crutial assumption and it is weakend in Buchanan & Lee (1981). 
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assumption is that government applies a higher than market discount rate to future tax 
revenue. In particular it is assumed that the political time horizon is shorter than the period of 
time necessary for complete private sector response to a tax rate change.133  
Government (or more precisely the political decision makers) is assumed to be short-
lived and thus preffering in short-run more revenue. Therefore they face the short-run Laffer 
curve and their optimal tax rate is set as revenue-maximizing on the short-run Laffer curve. 
However, this rate falls into the downward sloping (prohibitive) part of the long-run Laffer 
curve. The long-run is defined as the period sufficiently long to allow for full behavioral 
adjustment to each rate of tax on base.134  
Thus the reduction in tax rate would reduce the revenue in short-run and increase 
them in irrelevant (for the government) long-run case. Therefore the authors argue that 
government would never operate on the down slope of the long-run Laffer curve.  
The authors also discuss the issue when the expectations are introduced. 
Government and taxpayers would be better off if rates could be reduced and revenue 
increased. The government could increase the revenue only by convincing the taxpayers that 
rate cuts are permanent. However taxpayers in their setting do expect short-run maximizing 
behaviour of government and thus they do not expect these tax changes to be premanent. Thus 
both groups find themselves in a dillema which might be difficult to escape from.135 
According to the authors mutual gains could be secured only if government can 
somehow bind itself through some sort of commitment to lower rates below equilibrium 
levels in the short-run model and to hold these rates.136 As a solution they suggest 
introduction of some sort of genuinely constitutional ceilings and thus also reducing the 
policy costs as was discussed in chapter two. 
3.2.A Shifty Laffer Curve 
 
 Another intresting remark about Laffer curve behaviour was made by Becsi in his 
paper.137 He states that the shape of Laffer curve depends on the way how the tax revenue are 
                                                 
133 Buchanan & Lee (1982), p. 817. 
134 Ibid, pp. 817-818. 
135 This dillema could resemble to the dynamic inconsistency problem in monetary policy as was firstly 
described by Kydland & Prescot (1977). With discretionary monetary policy and with rational (adaptive) 
expectations of people the equilibrium inflation is extremely high and is not accompanied by the GDP growth. 
Thus monetary authority (central bank) is not successful in any of its goals and the equilibrium is not beneficial 
for any party as in our specification with tax rates and revenue. The literature gives several solutions to this 
problem which in general include some sort of monetary policy rules. 
136 In Buchanan & Lee (1982), p. 819. 
137 In Becsi (2000). 
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spent by the government and thus it is important to observe the expenditure policy of the 
government as well, in order to derive the actual Laffer curve. Becsi introduces a simple 
dynamic macroeconomic model138 consisting of households, production and government 
sectors.139 He studies the long-run effects of taxes and thus the attention is given to the steady-
state equilibrium of the introduced model.  
He evaluates the personal income taxes and three possible ways how the additional 
revenue would be spent by government in order to balance the budget. The lump-sum 
transfers back to the people have no long-run macroeconomic effect and thus they would not 
change the Laffer curve. On the other hand, if the share of public capital would be increased 
in order to balance the budget the Laffer curve will shift upwards and thus it would lie above 
the Laffer curve for lump-sum transfers. Also the revenue-maximizing income tax rate would 
be greater.  
The last case considered is the increase of share of public consumption to balance 
the budget and the Laffer curve corresponding to the public consumption lies above both 
previous cases.140 All three cases are depicted in Figure 3.3. Author therefore concludes that 
without the reference to the expenditure policy the possible effects on tax revenue may be 
miscalculated since wrong Laffer curve could be used.  
   Figure 3.3: Shifty Laffer Curve 
 
   Source: Becsi (2000)  
                                                 
138 This model is based on Baxter & King (1995). 
139 The model per se is described in Becsi (2000), pp.56-58 and p. 63. 
140 See Becsi (2000), pp.60-62 for detailed discussion about the results of the model for those three possible 
cases. 
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Also in his other paper Becsi examines the way how government spends the 
collected revenue in order to balance the budget.141 Contrary, the author uses static general 
equilibrium model and he again examines the personal income tax and thus the Laffer effects 
on this kind of taxation.142 He concludes that if budget-balancing lump-sum transfers to 
people accompany the tax rate change and thus there are less provided public goods (or other 
goods provided by the government) the likelihood of Laffer efects increases.143  
Therefore, this is similar conclusion as derived from his dynamic model. Although 
this is very intresting approach, we do not evaluate the expenditure policy of government in 
our model in next chapters for following reasons. The availability of data for government 
expenditures is limited, we also try to comply with parsimony of the econometric model. Not 
least Becsi’s models are designed for the personal income tax, however we will deal with 
corporate income tax which has different features and the results of such model could thus 
differ. 
3.2.B Multiple Peaks of the Laffer Curve 
 
Another intresting finding regarding the shape of the Laffer curve was made by 
Spigel and Templeman.144 In their paper authors examine the shape of the Laffer curve from 
personal income taxation on a micro level for individuals. Then they try to aggregate their 
findings and introduce the macro level Laffer curve as a vertical summation of individualistic 
Laffer curves of heterogeneous individuals in the society. 
The authors claim that if certain assumptions hold145 the macro level Laffer curve 
for the personal income tax is likely to have multiple (or at least dual) peaks, although the 
individual Laffer curves have only single peak. The authors derived the conditions under 
which the dual or multiple peak values of tax revenue are likely to occur. They conclude that 
these conditions reflecting  the diversity of income distribution are present in the western 
                                                 
141 In Becsi (2002). 
142 See Becsi (2002), pp. 2-7 for the description of the static equilibrium model. 
143 In Becsi (2002), pp 11-12. 
144 In Spigel & Templeman (2004). 
145 These assumptions are as follows: the wage distribution demonstrates a very high degree of inequality and 
thus is one-tailed assymetric. Each individual who earns a given hourly wage rate has a peak point of tax 
payment at a given tax rate, which differs for different individuals. The individualistic supply curve of labor is at 
some point backward bending, thus from certain point the relationship between labor supply and the wage rate is 
negative (substitution effect starts to dominate). For detailed discussion of those assumptions see Spigel & 
Templeman (2004), pp. 61-62. 
  43
societies and thus the probability of personal income tax Laffer curve being mulitple peaked 
is high.146   
Therefore it is possible that the change in the tax rate would have ambiguous effect 
on the tax revenue, which is not the case when the traditionally shaped Laffer curve is known. 
The authors also suggest that with this result the policymakers have different choices since the 
issue does not reflect simple fiscal question how to finance the government’s budget. Rather 
the issue shifts to tax burden and thus it could be understood as to whom do the policymakers 
wish to impose the tax burden – the low income, the middle income or the high income group. 
Therefore the decision-making should cover also political, psychological, social issues and the 
issue of fairness.147     
3.2.C Is the Laffer Curve Continuous Function ? 
 
The fundamental condition of Laffer curve being a continuous function was 
examined by authors as Gahvari or Malcomson.148 The latter in his paper introduces the 
general equilibrium model with one private and one public good, where he examines the 
personal income tax of identical individuals.149 He concludes that even for well-behaved 
utility functions the Laffer curve may not be continuous and may have no interior maximum. 
Thus the author suggest determining the Laffer curve from empirical evidence and rather not 
from the theory.150 
 Gahvari went even further and he argued that the Laffer curve could have 
discountinuity at a tax rate equal one (100%). Thus according to Gahvari the tax revenue from 
personal income taxation could continue to increase as tax rate increases as long as the tax 
rate remains below one.151 In his setting for identical individuals, the income effect always 
dominates the substitution effect and thus consumption of leisure decreases and labor supply 
increases at any wage rate.152 
Gahvari also showed in his other study in the model with identical individuals and 
two private goods (one of them could be produced by the government) that when the tax 
                                                 
146 In Spigel & Templeman (2004), p. 65. 
147 Ibid, pp. 65-66. 
148 We refer mainly to Gahvari (1988), Gahvari (1989) and Malcomson (1986). 
149 See Malcomson (1986), pp. 265-269 for the describtion of the used model. 
150 In Malcomson (1986), pp. 277-278. 
151 In Gahvari (1988), p.267. 
152 Ibid, pp 267-268. However if we evaluate the empirical labor supply we see that the individuals are different 
and the substitution effect at some wage rate starts to dominate and it makes the labor supply curve backward 
bending. For empirical evidence of backward bending labor supply see e.g. Link & Settle (1981) or Blundell & 
Meghir (1986). 
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revenue are used to provide a government good rather than cash transfers to consumers the 
discontinuity may be present and the Laffer curve may always be upward-sloping.153 Thus he 
also claims that the shape of the Laffer curve depends on the way how government 
redistributes its revenue as Becsi does, however their results are different. 
3.2.D Concluding Remarks 
 
We have seen that the traditional shape of Laffer curve was challanged several 
times, however all of these articles referred rather to the personal income tax Laffer curve and 
did not consider the case of corporate income taxes.  
Also the modelling of those different shapes would be much more complicated and 
it even might not be testable.154 Moreover, the traditional shape of the Laffer curve is now 
used in standard economic textbooks.155 
Therefore, in the chapters concerning our model for corporate income tax Laffer 
curve our approach will be to implicitly expect the traditional shape of the Laffer curve and 
we would try to approve this shape or deny it. If we reject the traditional shape then we would 
discuss the other shapes which were proposed. 
 In the following chapter we will investigate the estimations of Laffer curve and 
Laffer effects in the literature.   
                                                 
153 In Gahvari (1989), pp. 251-252. 
154 See Heijman & van Ophem (2005), p.716, footnote 6. 
155 See e.g. Samuelson & Nordhaus (1995), pp. 795-797. 
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4 Review of Literature Concerning the Laffer Curve 
Estimation 
 
In this chapter we would review the estimates of Laffer curve and revenue-
maximizing tax rate as was done in the literature. We will not review all of the literature 
concerning this topic, however we would try to cover the most important ones. We will not 
focus solely on the econometric estimates, we would try to include also other estimates based 
on certain (static and dynamic) models or even real experiments and we would also mention 
the simple analysis based on macroeconomic facts. 
Rather non-mathematic exploration of Laffer effects in three cases of American 
recent history was done by Laffer in his paper.156 He examines the so called Harding-
Coolidge tax cuts after WW1, where the top marginal personal income tax rate fell from 77% 
to 25% in 1925. Although tax revenue data for that period are not available, the author uses 
the total federal receipts as well as GDP and unemployment figures to illustrate the positive 
impact of those tax cuts.157   
Top marginal income tax was cut by president Kennedy in year 1964 from 91% to 
70%, and in the four years the total government income tax revenue increased by 9 percent 
annually.158 Laffer also examines tax cuts made by president Reagan from 1981 to 1988, 
when apart other changes the highest marginal income tax rate was reduced from 70% up to 
28%. The author suggests positive impact of these tax cuts on inflation, unemployment and 
also on the tax revenue, although these years were also stigmatized by large government 
budget deficits.159  
4.1 Estimations Based on Equilibrium Models 
 
In this section we will review the estimations of Laffer curve, Laffer effects and 
revenue-maximizing tax rate in equilibirum models. The static ones were used mainly in 
                                                 
156 In Laffer (2004). 
157 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
158 Ibid, pp.5-7 where the Kennedy tax cuts are examined. 
159 The tax cuts done by Reagan are examined in Laffer (2004), pp. 7-10. These controversial impacts of 
Reagan’s tax cuts brought various opinions regarding them. Some studies proposed that the tax cuts were not 
substantive enough due to the high inflation (McKenzie (1982)), others stressed the favourable impact of those 
tax cuts on work incentives and net GDP (see e.g. Feldstein (1986)), however critiques of these cuts were 
concerned with high budget deficits, which could have offset all the stimulative effect (see e.g. Akhatar & Harris 
(1992)). 
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1980’s, more recent approach is to use dynamic models in order to capture the long-run 
effects of a tax change. We also review some country specific estimations. 
 
4.1.A Static Models 
 
Canto, Joines and Laffer in their paper160 develop a static one-sector, two-factor 
(capital and labor) equilibrium model to analyze the effect of taxation on revenue. The taxes 
are assumed to be proportional on the incomes of factor of production.161 With this setting 
they derived revenue-maximizing tax rate and concluded that the increase in the tax rate could 
increase as well as reduce government revenue, that all depends on the supply and output 
elasticities of the factors of production.162 The authors then examined data on tax revenue and 
real per capita output before and after Kennedy tax cuts of 1962-1964163,  and they conclude 
that these tax cuts had a positive impact on economic activity and there was no significant 
loss of revenue caused by them.164 
Blinder in his paper165 also confirms the theoretical existence of the Laffer curve. 
However, he is sceptical that some broadly-based tax (personal or corporate income tax) 
would have passed the revenue-maximizing rate and would be in the prohibitive area.166 
When the author examines the flat income tax on labor (there is not general equilibirum 
approach) he derives that the tax rate which maximizes the revenue is equal to 
( )* 1S DD St
η η
η η
−= − + .
167  
Thus the elasticities have to be rather high in order to get revenue-maximizing tax 
rate lower than one (e.g. ( ) ( ); 2; 2S Dη η = − in order to get * 23t =  ). Since these values of 
elasticities are empirically much lower, the author concludes that for broad-based tax rates the 
                                                 
160 In Canto et al. (1981). 
161 For detailed description of the used model and for the derivation of revenue–maximizing tax rates see Canto 
et al. (1981), pp. 4-17. 
162 See Canto et al. (1981), p. 13 for the exact formula for revenue-maximizing tax rates. 
163 See Canto et al. (1981), pp. 17-28 for empirical analysis of Kennedy tax cuts.  
164 Thus it would imply that before the tax cut some tax rates were in their prohibitive ranges and therefore the 
Laffer effect was confirmed. 
165 In Blinder (1981). 
166 Ibid, p. 84. 
167 Ibid, p.86, the Sη stands for income elasticity of labor supply and Dη represents income elasticity of labor 
demand. 
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revenue-maximizing tax rate is very likely to be high and thus it is unlikely that the tax rate 
would be in its prohibitive area.168 
In other part of his paper the author uses the revenue-maximizing tax rates derived 
from the equilibrium model by Canto, Joines and Laffer. Blinder calibrates those formulas 
with empirically possible values of parameters. Only for theε - general price elasticity of 
supply of factors to the market sector is not empirical evidence available and thus the author 
tries values of 0, 1 and 2. If the value of ε  is 2, the revenue-maximizing tax on labor income 
according to Blinder’s calibrations ranges from 0.26 to 0.3 and revenue-maximizing tax on 
capital income ranges from 0.42 to 0.57. For value of ε  being 1 or 0 the reported revenue-
maximizing tax rates are significantly higher and since the author suggests that this elasticity 
should be rather low, he again concludes that the tax rates are only very unlikely in its 
prohibitive areas. 169 
Also Fullerton uses in his paper a general equilibrium static tax model in order to 
investigate the relationship of tax rates and government revenue.170 The author focuses on the 
personal income labor tax and he runs over sixty simulations for different tax rates and 
different labor supply elasticities. For the basic value of labor supply elasticity (0.15) which 
he used, the tax revenue start to fall beyond the 78.8% tax of gross labor income.171 That is 
substantially more than the actual total marginal wedge of 31.8% used in the model.  
According to the simulation results the author suggests that the labor supply 
elasticity would have to be at least 2.5 to put the U.S. over the peak of the Laffer curve. 
Fullerton then presents estimates of labor supply elasticities which were done by other 
authors.172 He then concludes that the reported rather low elasticities suggest that the tax cuts 
in labor income tax would not increase revenue according to his model and simulations. Thus 
he derives similar results as those reported by Blinder.173 
4.1.B Country Specific Estimates  
 
Stuart in his study174 uses two-sector model, in one of them employed labor is taxed 
and in the second one, supplied labor is not taxed. The latter sector could be understood as 
                                                 
168 Ibid., p.87. 
169 See Blinder (1981), pp.89-91 for the calibration, the table of results for all values and for discussion. 
170 In Fullerton (1982), see pp. 8-12 for the basic description of the model. 
171 See Fullerton (1982), table 1 on p. 15 for detailed results of the simulations. 
172 See Fullerton (1982), table 2 on p. 18. 
173 However this “elasticities approach“ as was used e.g. by Blinder (1981) and Fullerton (1982) has several 
shortcomings, see e.g. Canto et al. (1981), pp. 17-18 for description of those shortcomings of this approach. 
174 In Stuart (1981). 
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illegal tax evasion by undeclared activities as well as completely legal forms of tax avoidance 
(work in your house, watching children etc.). The derived model is used for parametrization 
on swedish data, where as a base year  the year 1968 is employed and several scenarios are 
inspected.175  
The author concludes that the then (in year 1977) highest marginal income tax rate 
(80%) is above the revenue-maximizing tax rate which would be roughly 70% according to 
his parametrization. He also states that severe effects (on growth of the economy) of tax 
increase above some critical value could be associated with adjustment lags to the change. 
Social institutions and laws as well as slow changes in attitudes toward labor market 
participation and tax evasion contribute to the sluggish reaction of individual labour supply on 
those tax changes.176 
Very similar model and method of estimation is used by Ravestein and Viljbrief, 
who estimated Laffer curve for the Netherlands.177 For the parametrization the year 1970 was 
selected as a basis year. The authors assumed that tax revenue are redistributed on a lump-
sum basis and thus the revenue-maximizing marginal wedge tax rate equals 66.9% for year 
1970 and 67.4% for year 1985. Therefore the Netherlands would operate slightly in the 
prohibitive area of the Laffer curve in year 1985, since in that year the marginal wedge 
reached its maximum. The authors also examined the welfare losses generated by tax 
increases.178  
4.1.C Dynamic Models 
 
Several studies explore the tax cut effects in models with endogenous growth. In 
such a setting the reduction in tax rate will have positive and permanent impacts on the 
growth rate of the economy, through the incentives created for savings and investment in 
either type of capital.179  Thus the tax base might increase and the Laffer effects would 
express themselves in following years and the tax cut might eventually finance itself. 
Therefore the use of dynamic models seems appropriate.  
                                                 
175 See Stuart (1981), pp. 1022-1024 for detailed description of used model and pp. 1024-1029 for the 
parametrization. 
176 In Stuart (1981),pp. 1034-1035. 
177 See Ravestein & Vijlbrief (1988), pp. 206-209 for detailed description of the model. 
178 See Ravestein & Vijlbrief (1988), pp. 212-216 for the results of their parametrization and for sensitivity 
analysis. 
179 In Novales & Ruiz (2001). 
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This approach was probably introduced by Ireland in his paper.180 He used simple 
endogenous growth AK production model181 and he considers a single tax on output. The 
author finds that the dynamic Laffer effects are possible in the use of his model. On numerical 
example the author illustrates that although the permanent decrease in taxes would contribute 
to larger deficits, the expansionary effects could, ceteris paribus, in long-run generate larger 
revenue.182 He concludes that the reduction in the marginat tax rate can be the key to both 
vigorous rates of real growth and long-run government budget balance in the U.S. economy 
today.183 
Simple AK model was also used by Agell and Persson184 and the authors use 
illustrative calculations for OECD countries to highlight the scope of dynamic Laffer effects 
in the real world. The authors introduce two different definitions of Laffer effects. The first is 
to study the revenue implications under the assumption that government sticks to its original 
consumption and transfer program, in spite of the fact that tax cut boosts the growth rate of 
output. The second is to assume that government is commited to maintain constant spending 
ratios to output also after tax cut.185  
The authors then conclude that there never can be Laffer effects in the sence of 
second definition in such a model.186 They try to estimate the Laffer effects for the first 
definition. They have disregarded the probems concerning different taxation in the real world 
(physical capital is taxed by corporate and personal income tax, human capital is taxed by 
personal income tax and payroll taxes etc.) and set the tax rate in their model equal to the total 
tax revenue (including and excluding social security contributions) to GDP.187  
The results are very sensitive to the intertemporal rate of substitution, if this rate is 
close to zero, then Laffer effects are not self-financing in any OECD country and some other 
tax have to be raised in order to compensate for the dynamic revenue lost. On the other hand, 
if intertemporal rate of substitution would be around 0.9 then nordic countries as well as 
                                                 
180 In Ireland (1994). 
181 The model could be described by following production function: ( )Y f K AK= = , where K can represent 
human and physical capital and A is an exogenous technological constant, for the detailed description of the 
model see Ireland (1994), pp.560-562. 
182 See Ireland (1994), pp.568-570 for the numerical example. 
183 In Ireland (1994), p. 570. 
184 In Agell & Persoon (2000). 
185 Ibid., p.7, the exact definitions of those two approaches are given in pp. 8-9. 
186 See Agell & Persoon (2000), pp.13-16 for exact derivation of this fact. 
187 See Agell & Persoon (2000), pp.17-18 for the discussion about usage of a tax rate in their model. 
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Netherlands, France, Belgium or Austria may enjoy the benefits of dynamic Laffer effect 
when cutting the tax rates.188  
Another paper which examines the dynamic Laffer effects was written by Novales 
and Ruiz.189 The authors used endogenous growth model with two sectors for physical and 
human capital and they explored the Laffer effects for capital taxation and labor income 
taxation. The tax cut which produces positive effects on tax base and may allow for the 
repaying the debt, which was initially issued by the government by the tax cut, the authors 
name feasible tax cut.190  
The authors calibrate their model on US data and they start with initial values of 
capital and labor income taxation being 50% and 30% respectively.191 They showed that 
feasible tax cuts can be quite substantial and the effects on long-run growth and welfare are 
increasing in the size of the tax cut. Largest feasible reduction in labor income taxation is to 
15%, which leads to a welfare gain by 14.9% every period. The maximum feasible cut in 
capital taxation is to the tax rate of solely 7% (while maintaining the income taxation on the 
level of 30%) and that leads to rather lower welfare gain of 12.6% every period.192  
Evidently these derived results would change significantly if the values of parametrs 
of their model would change. For example the elasticity of substitution have to be above 0.56 
in order to receive feasible tax cuts.193 The authors also suggest that simultaneous smaller cuts 
in both tax rates could be preffered in terms of welfare gains. However, that is left for further 
research. 
4.1.D Estimation of Laffer Effects without Deriving the Laffer Curve 
 
A somewhat different approach was used by Krause in his recent study.194 He uses 
general equilibrium tax model and tax reform techniques to directly examine the Laffer 
argument by characterising the conditions under which a small increase in labor income tax 
necessarily results in lower tax revenue.195 This approach allows the author to directly 
                                                 
188 In Agell & Persoon (2000), pp. 18-20. 
189 In Novales & Ruiz (2001). 
190 Ibid, p. 182. 
191 They also use the starting labor taxation being equal to 23%, to get the results of that calibration see Novales 
& Ruiz (2001), pp. 198-200. 
192 To see these results and their derivation see Novales & Ruiz (2001), pp. 191-200. 
193 In Novales & Ruiz (2001), p. 205, however Agell & Persoon (2000) states that for U.S. economy the 
coefficient must be at least 1.15 to enjoy feasible tax cuts. Thus you can see that different models might bring us 
very different results. 
194 In Krause (2007). 
195 The model is described in Krause (2007), pp. 6-8 and is based on classis general equilibrium tax model 
suggested by Diamond & Mirrlees (1971). 
  51
examine Laffer effects without deriving the Laffer curve per se. In this general setting the 
author concludes that the Laffer effects require an economy with rather high labor income tax 
rates and labor supply considerably sensitive to changes in wages. Thus the labor supply 
elasticity have to be high in order to obtain the Laffer effects.196 
 
4.2 Other Types of Estimations 
 
In this section we would review the estimates of Laffer effects which focuses on the 
tax evasion, when the tax rate is high. That kind of estimation was even executed for one type 
of indirect taxation–VAT. We also review some economic experiments which tried to 
estimate Laffer effects and confirm the existence of the Laffer curve. 
4.2.A Estimates based on Tax Evasion 
 
In the study of Dutch authors Heijman and van Ophem197 they try to take into 
account a possible shift to black labor activities (unreported or informal sector).198  Therefore 
their potential income consists of registred income (measured through GDP), non-realised 
income (inactivity of part of population) and non-registred income (black labor activities).199 
By means of discrepancy method the authors then estimates the size of the black labor 
economy and other variables for selected 12 OECD countries and they report the results for 
years 1995 and 1996.200   
The revenue-maximizing tax rate ranges from 53% to 60%.201 The authors then 
conclude that the revenue-maximizing tax rate is higher than the actual marginal tax rate in 11 
of 12 examined countries.202 Thus according to their model only in  Sweden  we can  witness 
overall Laffer effects, since the revenue-maximizing tax rate is 58% and the actual marginal 
tax rate equals to 65%.203  
                                                 
196 For the exact mathematic derivation of these conclusions see Krause (2007), pp. 9-14. 
197 In Heijman & van Ophem (2005). 
198 See e.g. Schneider & Enste (2003) for the discussion about black labor activities, their reasons and impacts. 
199 See Heijman & van Ophem (2005), pp. 716-718 for detailed description of their model. 
200 See Heijman & van Ophem (2005), pp. 718-721 for description of the method used and for reported results. 
The authors had problems with the data to calculate the size of the black sector in every country, thus they fixed 
the size of black sector to 8.8% of registred income, which was the result obtained for the Netherlands. The 
authors suggest that this assumption prooved to have little influence in the sensitivity analysis – see Heijman & 
van Ophem (2005), p. 722. 
201 The tax rate used includes all taxes not only the income tax.  
202 In Japan and UK the revenue-maximizing tax rate is even twice that high as the actual marginal rate. The 
results are reported in Heijman & van Ophem (2005), p. 719, Table 2. 
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The tax evasion and avoidance and the implications for the Laffer curve are also 
examined in study by Matthews, who focuses on indirect taxation, in particular on VAT in 
selected EU countries.204 The author suggests that the design of VAT produce less incentives 
to evade, since the tax is paid and reclaimed at each stage of the production. However, on the 
other hand since there exist several rates of VAT in EU and other exceptions and 
derogations,205 there is a possibility to avoid the higher rate by misclassification of the 
produced good.206  
The author then develops a simple model and examines it on unbalanced panel data 
for 14 countries of EU. He uses the standard rate of VAT as a proxy for weighted average 
rate, since there is lack of the data. The author employs method of Robust estimation and 
instrumental variable estimation for his model.207 Matthews concludes that the quadratic term 
in the VAT rate is significant and correctly signed and thus it implies the existence of Laffer 
curve for VAT. The revenue-maximizing rate of VAT should be in the range of 18-19.3% 
according to his estimations and thus he argues that there could be the upper bound in EU for 
standard rate not higher than 19%.208 
4.2.B Economic Experiments 
 
The intresting way how to estimate the Laffer curve is by establishing an economic 
experiment. They allow the researchers to investigate the issue uder controlled conditions. 
There were not many experiments made, however we found two papers that examined the 
issue of Laffer effects with the use of economic experiment. 
Swenson in his study209 reported an experiment where he examines the implications 
of Laffer curve on the labor supply, thus he again concentrated on personal income tax issue. 
Subjects in that experiment had to perform work by putting key strokes on a computer in 
order to receive some income per stroke. And alternative to working and receiving income 
subjects were able to read magazine, play video game on PC etc.  
                                                                                                                                                        
203 However, we think that the method of using a single tax which would aggregate all taxes in the economy 
could caused such results. We believe that it is rather more convenient to examine single tax in order to explore 
whether Laffer effects are present and the tax rate is in its prohibitive area or not.  
204 In Matthews (2003). 
205 See European Commission (2008) for detailed description of different VAT rates and exceptions for 
particular member states of EU. 
206 See Matthews (2003), pp. 106-108 for detailed discussion. 
207 See Matthews (2003), pp. 107-108 for the description of the model and pp. 109-112 for the data selection and 
the description of estimation methods used. The results are presented in Table 1 on p. 111. 
208 In Matthews (2003), pp. 112-113, note that the minimum rate for standard VAT in the then EC was set by the 
directive (92/77/EEC) at 15% and upper bound for the standard rate was assigned to be 25% by the political 
decision. 
209 In Swenson (1988). 
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Five different tax rates (12%, 28%, 50%, 73%, 87%) were given endogenously in 
random order. They applied for three consecutive periods of five minutes work. Swenson’s 
conclusions do confirm the Laffer effects, the overall tax payments were maximized at second 
highest rate (73%) and the work effort was maximized at the second lowest rate (28%).210  
Another real effort economic experiment concerning this topic was performed by 
Sutter and Weck-Hannemann.211 The authors try to endogenize the tax rates by designing 
an interactive two-person game. One subject had to work to generate income and the second 
subject could taxed the generated income.212 Apart the Laffer effects the authors also 
examined the effect of “veil of ignorance“213 on the individual decisions by introducing two 
treatment conditions.  
Under certainty treatment the individual positions are exogenously fixed and known 
from the beginning, however under uncertainty treatment both subjects are uncertain about 
their position (veil of ignorance) and thus both vote on the possible tax bound. The authors 
conclude that the tax revenue have their global peak at tax rates of 50-65%, thus confirming 
the Laffer effects, on the other hand authors also suggest that there could be more peaks in 
Laffer curve as we have already discussed. The effort levels decrease with a rise in tax rates 
as was expected, sharp decline in effort is around 50% to 55% tax rates.  
Another finding was that there is no statistically significant difference in upper tax 
limits for the different treatment conditions. Therefore that does not confirm the hypothesis of 
more fair voting under veil of ignorance.214  
 
4.3 Solely Econometric Estimations of Laffer Effects 
 
In previous sections of this chapter we also reviewed some studies which used 
econometric estimations as well.215 However, now we would focus on studies, where the 
econometric estimation was essential. Eventually we also will be able to examine the 
corporate income tax estimates of Laffer effects. 
 
                                                 
210 See Swenson (1988) for detailed results and discussion. 
211 In Sutter & Weck-Hannemann (2002). 
212 See Sutter & Weck-Hannemann (2002), pp. 4-6 and Appendix for the complete description of design of their 
experiment. 
213 This concept was introduced by Rawls (1971), where the decision makers know the possible states of society, 
however they do not know their specific position under those states of society. 
214 The complete results of the experiment are presented in Sutter & Weck-Hannemann (2002), pp.11-21. 
215 E.g. Matthews (2003). 
  54
4.3.A Personal Income Tax Estimation 
 
The personal income tax was further estimated by Yu Hsing.216 He examines the 
U.S. data for 1959-1991 and he uses four functional forms (linear, log-log, linear-log and log-
linear) of a simple model similar to our benchmark model in next chapters.217 The author 
chooses proportion of income tax revenue to taxable income as a representation of tax rate 
used and real income tax revenue per capita as the dependent variable. According to his 
results the revenue-maximizing tax rate for the U.S. personal income tax varies from 32.6% to 
35.2%. Thus the author confirms the existence of Laffer curve and since average federal tax 
rates were lower (around 20%), the author suggests that there was a room for increase which 
would have been associated by revenue increase. However, the then marginal maximum of 
federal income tax at 36% was expected to be in the prohibitive area.218   
4.3.B Corporate Income Tax Estimations 
 
The Laffer effects for corporate income taxation were estimated in two recent 
studies. Both used the data for sample of OECD countries and the top marginal statutory 
corporate income tax rates. Kimberley Clausing was in her paper219 examining the 
determinants of corporate tax revenue. For her model she examined the data for years 1979 to 
2002 for 29 OECD countries, however some countries were added only for several years in 
the analysis (transition economies, Korea and others were added in the mid 1990’s). With the 
simple model similar to one we present in following chapters she confirmed the shape of the 
Laffer curve, although she does not mention it directly. Moreover the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate according to her results would be around 33%.220 Then she also added some other 
variables into the model, which improved the fit of the model221 and if we calculate the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate it increased to the range of 39 to 41.5%. 
                                                 
216 In Yu Hsing (1996). 
217 See Yu Hsing (1996), pp. 397-398 for description of the model and functional forms. We believe that the use 
of different functional forms is not fundamental, since the results are very similar and thus in our model we use 
solely the linear specification. 
218 See Yu Hsing (1996), pp. 398-400 for the reported results and following discussion. 
219 In Clausing (2007). 
220 See Clausing (2007), pp. 126-127 for detailed results. 
221 Such as the corporate share in the GDP and corporate profitability, however the number of observations is 
reduced significantly by that. In our models we do not present such variables. Our time period starts from year 
1965 and if we add those variables, the number of observations would reduce by at least two thirds, since there is 
significant lack of those data. Therefore we stick to our benchmark model and then we try to find the best 
appropriate econometric representation. However, the results which we present closely resembles to those 
reported by Clausing.  
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Brill and Hassett use the similar model of 29 OECD countries for years 1980 to 
2006. They examine the data on the simple benchmark model and they conclude that the 
revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate is in the range of  30 to 37% depending on the 
countries included in the sample.222 Moreover they test whether the Laffer curve was 
constatnt for the whole time period. They find out that the results for 5 (6) years period do not 
differ significantly. However, in the latest six year period (2000-2006) the revenue-
maximizing tax rate decreased under 30%.223 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
We have seen that there are several ways how to estimate the Laffer curve and (or) 
the Laffer effects. As we have witnessed the concept of Laffer curve is not disputed per se. 
However, the literature is diverging in the conclusions, some authors do confirm that the 
Laffer effects could occur for some tax rates in some countries and thus they would operate 
on the prohibitive range of the Laffer curve. On the other hand, some authors claim that it is 
highly improbable that those effects could be discovered for some broadly based tax. 
Since the issue of Laffer curve and Laffer effects for corporate income taxation was 
not reviewed many times, we would focus on this taxation. Moreover, we think that firms and 
corporations have several possibilities how to avoid high profit (income) taxation and 
therefore support the Laffer effects. Thus before we introduce our econometric models, we 
will focus on the effects on corporate income tax revenue and how the corporations are able to 
avoid high taxation in the next chapter.   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
222 See Brill & Hassett (2007), tables on p. 15 for the results of regressions and pp. 9-10 for comments regarding 
the results. 
223  See Brill & Hassett (2007), tables on p. 16 and pp. 11-12 for comments. 
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5 Corporate Tax Rates, Revenue and Possible Laffer 
Effects 
 
In this chapter we would focus on the corporate income taxation. We examine the 
trends in tax rates and corresponding tax revenue from this taxation in OECD countries. We 
also slightly review the issue of tax competition. Then we focus on the determinants of tax 
revenue and the possibilities how the Laffer effects could arise in the corporate income 
taxation. 
 
5.1 Development of Corporate Income Tax Rates 
 
We would explore the development in the corporate income taxation on 20 OECD 
countries, although there is currently 30 OECD member countries.224 This group of 20 OECD 
countries is also explored in our panel data model in chapter seven. Reasons for that reduction 
are mainly the unavailability of the data for remaining 10 countries. These reasons and also 
the list of examined countries are listed in section 7.1 of this thesis. 
In Figure 5.1 you can find the development of statutory corporate income tax rates in 
our sample of 20 OECD countries since 1965 until 2006. Those statutory rates are either top 
marginal rate (if in a given country there is a progressive taxation system) or a standard 
statutory rate. From the figure we can see that until the year 1985 the average statutory 
corporation tax rate slightly increased and it reached its peak of 44.9% in year 1985. Since 
then we can see visible decreasing trend.  
The average statutory rate was at its minimum of 29.1% at year 2006. The mean 
value of average statutory corporation tax rate is 38.9%. Therefore there are signs of corporate 
tax competition which push the tax rates down, however the “race to the bottom” is not that 
rapid and we would discuss this issue and also other possible explanations of this trend in 
corporate tax rates in greater detail below. 
 
                                                 
224 For the complete list of OECD countries see e.g.: 
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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Figure 5.1: Development of Average Statutory Corporation Income Tax Rate in 20  
OECD Countries from 1965 to 2006225 
 
Source: World Tax Database (University of Michigan), OECD, see section 6.1.D for  
detailed description of used data sources 
 
 
In Figure 5.2 you can moreover see the development of statutory corporate income 
tax rates in all our sample countries. We state there the rates in the beggining of the period 
(1965) in the middle (1985) and on the end of the period (2006) as well as the average tax rate 
for each country. 
From Figure 5.2 it is evident that in most of the countries the statutory tax rates felt 
significantly. The most notable decrease was in Ireland, significant decrease of corporate 
income tax rates was also in Sweden, Luxemburg or Finland. On the other hand, the statutory 
corporate tax rates even slightly increased in Spain and almost did not change in Italy. 
However, those are the only two exceptions. 
 
                                                 
225 Note that we are using unweighted averages of statutory tax rates. 
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Figure 5.2:Corporate Income Tax Rates for Selected Years (in % )226 
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 Source: World Tax Database (University of Michigan), OECD, see section 6.1.D for  
 detailed description of used data sources 
 
 
5.1.A Tax Competition as an Explanation 
 
We would now discuss the possible explanations of the declining trend of corporate 
income tax rates since the late 1980’s. The main candidate to explain this trend is the 
corporate tax competition, where the countries or regions compete to attract firms and capital 
to settle down in their country. The tools for the competition are evidently the statutory 
corporate tax rates as well as overall corporate environment (regulations, penalties, legal tax 
base, existence of tax holidays, existence and size of other taxes etc.) Therefore we would 
review fundamentals of this concept.  
The opinions of authors differ greatly in this topic, some of the papers support the idea 
of tax competition and its benefits for the welfare, on the other hand, others support the idea 
of tax harmonisation (convergence of tax rates and unification of tax rules and tax bases). In 
1950’s Tiebout tackled this issue in his theory of local public good provision.227 In his setting 
                                                 
226 Since we do not have data for United Kingdom for year 1965, we substituted this tax rate by corporate tax 
rate in 1970 – which is the first available. 
227 In Tiebout (1956). 
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low taxes as a result of tax competition stimulate individuals to reside in that region with 
these low taxes and a certain level of public goods being provided. This approach could be 
extended, inter alia, to include mobile firms in the model. They are modeled in a similar 
manner as mobile residents, only the assumtion of infinitely elastic supply has to be 
fulfilled.228 
The tax competition which is harming and wasteful is ussually described by some 
departure from the idealized setting as it is described by Tiebout.229 Those departures could be 
understood as different kinds of externalities such as interregional, pecuniary or fiscal 
externality.230 
Some authors fear that in the most pesimistic scenarios the tax competition will lead 
to a “race-to-the-bottom” and it will end up with very low taxes and therefore the public 
goods will be underprovided.231 Therefore there are tendencies to introduce at least minimum 
tax rates and furthermore harmonize different tax systems among OECD or EU countries.232 
The literature is not unified even in evaluating whether the decline in corporate tax 
rates is a result of tax competition. For example Slemrod in his paper233 examined the data for 
selected OECD countries on time period 1975 to 1995. He concludes that according to his 
analysis there is not much direct evidence that competitive pressures have large effect on 
statutory corporate tax rates and the author would suggest that it is rather the convergence of 
countries in economic structures that caused this trend.234  
Steward and Webb examined the corporate tax burdens in OECD countries between 
1950 and 1999. They concluded that there is no evidence of the race-to-the-bottom and only 
very limited evidence of harmonization of tax burden.235  
On the other hand, for example Devereux et al. in their paper examined the data for 
21 industrialized countries from 1983 to 1999.236 They tried to estimate the tax reaction 
functions for the national governments based on detailed measures of corporate taxes. The 
authors find evidence that countries do compete over statutory corporate tax rates (and 
                                                 
228 See e.g. Richter & Wellisch (1996) for this kind of extension of the model. 
229 See Tiebout (1956). 
230 For the description of those externalities see Wilson (1999), pp. 272-273. 
231 See Grifith & Klemm (2004), p.3. 
232 See e.g. Nicodeme (2006), pp. 33-36 for explanation of gains from the corporate tax coordination. On the 
other hand, Parry (2003) tried to calculate the welfare losses in case of capital tax competition, he states that they 
seem to be very small and thus these results do not support the idea of setting the minimum tax rates in a bloc of 
regions or countries. 
233 In Slemrod (2004). 
234 See Slemrod (2004), pp. 1183-1184. 
235 In Steward & Webb (2006), pp. 189-191. 
236 In Devereux et al. (2002). 
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effective average tax rates) and that competition is assymetric. Thus countries react more 
significantly to changes when their tax rate is above average.237 
5.1.B Different Explanation 
 
Other hypothesis for the trend in the late 1980’s and beggining of 1990’s was stated 
by Gordon.238 The author noticed that the statutory corporate tax rates on a central 
government level felt significantly in U.S. in 1986 to 1988 (drop from 46% to 34%). He 
suggested that the U.S. economy have inordinate influence on other economies and therefore 
other countries followed this trend.239 However, since then the statutory corporate tax rate in 
U.S. did not change (see Figure 5.2) but the trend in other countries countinued. Thus there 
have to be some other reason for that trend (tax competition, convergence in economic 
structures etc.) 
In this section we have tried to explain the declining trend in the statutory corporate 
tax rates in last 30 years. One most profound explanation is the corporate tax competiton. 
However, some studies do not confirm that influence or the evidence is weak. We would 
conclude that there are probably several reasons for that decresing trend such as tax 
competition, convergence of economic principles etc. 
 
5.2 Development of Corporate Tax Revenue 
 
If we focus on the state revenue from the corporate income taxation in our sample of 
20 OECD countries, we see that this rather fundamental decrease of tax rates since mid-
1980’s was not accompanied by similar decrease in tax revenue. Moreover, as could be seen 
from Figure 5.3  the tax revenue from corporate income taxation rose in 1990’s. At the year 
1965 thus on average the corporate tax revenue generated 2.1% of GDP and in the last year of 
our investigation (2006) this revenue on average reached 3.9% of GDP. The mean value of 
corporate tax revenue reaches 2.63% of GDP.  From the  presented figures we can see that the 
tax revenue did not copy the trend in tax rates. That could have several reasons and 
explanations and we would focus on them in the final section of this chapter. We hypothesize 
that Laffer effects could have played a major role in that trend. 
                                                 
237 See Devereux et al. (2002), pp. 26-31 for the discussion concerning the results and Table 2 on p. 41 for their 
detailed results. 
238 In Gordon (1992). 
239 See Gordon (1992), pp. 1177-1178. 
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Figure 5.3: Development of Average Corporate Income Tax Revenue to GDP ( in %) in 20  
OECD Countires from 1965 to 2006240 
 
Source: OECD statistics, International Financial Statistics (IMF), own computations, see   
section 6.1.D for detailed description of used data sources 
 
There are also considerable country differences, while the least average corporate 
income tax revenue for the time period of 1965-2006 were in Greece – solely 1.,4% of GDP, 
the country with highest level od those average tax revenue is Norway with 4.3% of GDP. 
You can see those country specific developments in Figure 5.4, where we include all 20 
countries and corporate income tax revenue again for three selected years (1965, 1985 and 
2005) The last column for each country is the average tax revenue during the whole time 
period (1965-2006).  
We can highlight the develoment in Norway, where in 1965 the corporate tax 
revenue was slightly above 1% of GDP and after 40 years they exceeded 11.5% of GDP.241 
We can conclude that in most of the countries from our sample the ratio of tax revenue to 
GDP has increased (mainly during the 1990’s), in some countries such as in Norway or 
Greece, that increase was substantial. On the other hand, in Canada, Germany and in the 
                                                 
240 Note that we are using unweighted averages of those tax revenue. 
241 This is mostly explained by the high oil revenue in Norway, see e.g. Brill & Hassett (2007), p.10 or OECD 
(2007), p.30. 
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United States the tax revenue to GDP slightly decreased from 1965 to 2005 as could be seen 
from Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4:Corporate Income Tax Revenue for Selected Years (as % of GDP)242 
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5.3 The Determinants of Corporate Tax Revenue 
 
Evidently there are more factors which influence the corporate income tax revenue. 
The simplified formula could be written as Re   *  v statutory tax rate tax base= .  The corporate 
tax base is influenced by several direct and indirect factors and we would shortly examine 
them.  
As we have already seen in the previous chapter according to the theory the revenue 
would not react the same on e.g. one percentage point increase of corporate income tax rate. 
The arithmetic effect of such a change states that if the change does not influence the tax base, 
the revenue would increase proportionaly. However, the economic effect of such a change 
                                                 
242 Note that we do not present the corporate income tax revenue to GDP in United Kingdom in year 1965, since 
we do not have the data available. 
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would influence the tax base and thus the revenue could increase more (less) than 
proportionaly or certainly even decrease if we are in the prohibitive area of the Laffer curve. 
Thus it is fundamental to review the factors influencing the corporate income tax base. 
5.3.A Direct Effect Influencing the Tax Base 
 
As a direct effect we would mention the legal tax base, which is set of rules and 
principles introduced by the particular government. It basicly tells which profits could be 
deducted and which have to be included into the tax base of a corporation. It is very complex 
and vast legislation covering allowances for capital expenditure, valuation of assets, extent 
which expenses could be deducted from tax base, deductibility of contributions to pension 
reserves etc.  
The OECD study tried to examine the legal tax base, however they were able to 
evaluate solely the depreciation allowances.243 According to this analysis, they concluded that 
less generous tax depreciation allowances and elimination of special tax deductions and 
provisions have broaden the tax base in OECD countries, especially during the second half of 
the 1980’s.244 Thus this could be one explanation of the growth of the corporate tax revenue. 
5.3.B Indirect Effects Influencing the Tax Base 
 
There exist several other factors influencing the tax base variable indirectly. For our 
purposes we would divide them on factors of Laffer effects and other (non-Laffer) factors. 
The former would suggest that the lower corporate tax rate in a country, ceteris paribus, 
would positively influence the tax base and thus it would positively stimulate the tax revenue. 
Obviously this would be valid, vice versa, as well. The latter, on the other hand, would imply 
that due to this factors the tax base increased, per se (there is no influence of corporate tax 
rates). We would now examine both these groups little closer. 
5.3.C Factors of Laffer Effects 
 
We can start the specification of those factors with location decisions of 
multinational firms. Multinational firm takes into account the corporate tax rate as well as 
other factors (corporate environment etc.) to decide where to locate its production or affiliate. 
Thus this would suggest that countries with lower corporate tax rates and with more suitable 
                                                 
243 See OECD (2006), pp. 24-26. 
244 In OECD (2006), p. 33, note that the analysis is incomplete since the comlexity of the legal tax base is 
extensive. 
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corporate environment will attract those firms to reside and produce in their area.245 Devereux 
et al. concluded that the countries compete over statutory tax rates and thus the choice of 
multinational is ussually discrete between two locations as they stated in their model for 
mobile firms.246 Therefore the tax base in the countries with lower tax rates and more 
favourable corporate environment should increase according to this effect. 
 
Profit Shifting 
Another possibility how to avoid high corporate tax rates for the multinational 
corporation in the globalized economy is the possibility of profit shifting. There are several 
ways how this could be done, we would mention transfer pricing, re-assigning of common 
expenses and use of financial structure of company.   
The transfer pricing refers to the pricing of contributions transferred within an 
organization. Specifically, the multinational firm can reduce accounting profits in a high-tax 
country by overstating the prices of imports into this country and conversely by understating 
the prices of exports.247  
Most countries enforce such tax laws which are based on the arm’s length principle 
as defined in the OECD Model Tax Convention.248 Thus the transfer pricing is not legal in 
most of the countries. This principle basically states that prices should be the same as if the 
parties in the transaction would have not been related to each other.249 This should obviously 
limit the transfer pricing and it should ensure that the country gets to tax its proper share. 
However, even if those measures exist there is evidence on transfer pricing. For 
example Bartelsman and Beetsma found out on the sectoral data for 16 OECD countries and 
for time periods of 1970 to 1997 that this transfer pricing could be significant. They used 
back-of–the-envelope calculations and they suggest that a one-percentage point increase in the 
corporate tax rate leads to a 2.7% reduction in corporate tax  revenue compared to the case 
when profit-shifting is absent.250  
                                                 
245 See e.g. Hines (1996), pp. 39-40 for further discussion. 
246 See Devereux et al. (2002), p. 31 for conclusions and pp. 9-13 for the description of model with mobile firms. 
247 In Huizinga & Laeven (2005), p. 2. 
248 See OECD (2003), article 9 on p. 12. 
249 In Bartelsman & Beetsma (2000), p.3. 
250 See Bartelsman & Beetsma (2000), pp. 8-10 and Table 2 for reported results. The authors also tried to regress 
the tax revenue on tax rates and that produced an insignificant coefficient. We have to state, that they did not use 
the quadratic term of tax rates (to record for the Laffer effects) in that regression and that was probably the 
reason of such a result of insignificant coefficient. 
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On the other hand, Swenson examined the reported transfer prices for set of products 
imported into the U.S. from several countries between 1981 and 1988. She found only small 
effect of import prices on the tax revenue.251  
The multinational firms can furthermore affect the allocation of accounting profits 
through assigning debt to the high tax rate location.252 Thus the firm would reduce its tax 
base and in that location and increase the tax base in the other location with lower tax rate.  
   Another possibility of profit shifting for multinational company is the re-assigning 
of common expenses (R&D expenses etc.) to high tax locations.253 Thus the accounting 
profits in those locations would be obviously decreased and could be increased in low tax 
countries. Those profit shifting efforts should lower the tax base in high tax countries and 
contrariwise increase it in low corporate tax countries.254  
Since we examined those two factors (Laffer effects) influencing the tax base, we 
have to mention the role of tax havens. Those are countries with no or very low tax rates. Tax 
havens use means to help companies camouflage their home country tax avoidance.255 Typical 
example could be Malta, San Marino, Bahamas or Jersey.  
Other countries therefore use resources and certain provisions in an attempt to limit 
the transfer of tax revenue to the tax havens. Although this would suggest that the abolition of 
tax havens would stimulate the tax revenue and improved welfare in other countries the 
literature does not give such clear evidence.256   
 
Further Laffer Effects 
Yet another factor could be labeled as Laffer effect. The lower corporate income tax 
rates could increase the incentive to incorporate, if on the other hand the personal income tax 
rates are much higher. Therefore the profits could be shifted from non-corporate sector to 
corporate sector and thus it would positively influence the tax base.257 
                                                 
251 See Swenson (2001), p.22. 
252 In Huizinga-Laeven (2005), pp.2-3. 
253 Ibid., p. 3. 
254 See e.g. Huizinga-Laeven (2005) for the empirical evidence of those forms of profit shifting in Europe. They 
concluded that most of the European countries may have gained some tax revenue at the expense of Germany.  
255 In  Slemrod & Wilson (2006), p. 3. 
256 For example Slemrod & Wilson (2006) conclude that elimination of tax havens would improve the welfare in 
non-haven countries. On the other hand, Hines (2004) claims that the solution is unclear, since the tax haven 
activity stimulate investments in nearby high-tax countries. 
257 For the evidence see e.g. Gordon (1998), who discovered that effects for U.S. economy mainly in 1950’s and 
1960’s. 
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As the last example of Laffer effects influencing the tax base we can mention the 
inflow of investments. The reduced tax rates may increase the total amount of investment and 
thus it could positively influence the corporate profits and the tax base.258 
5.3.D Non-Laffer Factors 
 
We regard mainly two other factors which would influence the corporate tax base in 
a given country independent of the tax rate. The decline of certain sectors such as agriculture 
stimulate the importance of  corporate sector.259 Therefore that changing structure of economy 
could have also stimulated the tax base. 
Finally we can mention stricter enforcement of corporate tax laws and provisions. 
Intensified tax audits and greater sanctions might reduce the tax avoidance and tax evasion 
behaviour and thus strengten the tax base per se.260 
In this chapter we have reviewed the development of corporate income tax rates and 
revenue in sample of 20 OECD countries. Moreover we have tried to explain those 
developments and trends. The tax revenue are influenced by several factors. Apart from the 
arithmetic effect of tax rate, the corporate tax rate influence the revenue indirectly through tax 
base. Those factors we called Laffer effects. In the next two chapters we would try to capture 
those Laffer effects and estimate the Laffer curve for selected countries and for a panel of 20 
OECD countries. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
258 See e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) for panel study of 11 OECD countries from 1984 to 2000, where they 
conclude that tax differences do play crutial role in FDI locations. 
259 In OECD (2007), pp. 33-34. 
260 Ibid, p. 34. 
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6 Time–Series Models for Three Selected Countries261 
  
In this chapter we will investigate and estimate the Laffer curve on the corporate 
icome tax for three selected countries using time-series model. Next chapter will then create a 
panel of selected OECD countries and estimate the Laffer curve on the panel data. However, 
the author believe that it is important to examine the time-series data for at least some selected 
individual countries as well, in order to cover for the differences of particular countries which 
would arise.  
It is straightforward that the model with panel data would inevietably delete those 
differences (although we would allow for the country specific effects), since it will aggregate 
the data for the whole selected group of countries. Moreover, in the previous chapter we have 
seen that the development in tax rates and tax revenue was country-specific. Therefore, in this 
chapter the time-series model for Ireland, France and United Kingdom is chosen in order to 
show different outcomes for those countries. We selected those countries mainly because of 
illustrating these differences. Other reasons why these three particular countries were selected 
are stated in each country-specific section. 
First in this chapter the model, per se, would be explained. Then the structure of the 
model, data range and their sources, the used variables and their significance would be 
described. Also we would mention some limitations of the used model. In the next parts the 
individual countries would be explored and we would present the outcomes of the model. 
Also the assumtions of the time-series and classical regressions would be discussed in each 
case. 
6.1 Benchmark Model 
 
The basic and benchmark model for our purposes is presented in the equation (2). 
The model presented is still linear (the parameters of the model are linear), although the tax 
variable is non-linear in the latter case.  
 
2                       ( 2 )t t t t
t
R E V T A X T A X
G D P
α β ε= ∗ + ∗ +
 
 
                                                 
261 All the estimations in this and consequitive chapter were done using the EViews 5.0 econometric software.  
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The theory of Laffer curve suggests that the origin of the Laffer curve should initiate 
in the point [ ]0;0  and therefore we do not include intercept into our benchmark model. It is 
evidently derived from the fact that with zero tax rate there are no tax revenue from and thus 
the origin is at point [ ]0;0 .   
6.1.A Description of Variables 
 
Let us now describe the variables which would be used in our model. 
 
tREV - state revenue from the corporate income tax at a given year t (in nominal terms) 
tGDP  - GDP at year t (in nominal terms)  
tTAX - statutory corporate income tax rate on the central-government level at year t 
2
tTAX - statutory corporate income tax rate sqared at year t 
tε  - error term 
6.1.B The Structure of the Model 
 
In this section we would discuss the structure of the model and the inclusion of 
above mentioned variables into the model. The explained (dependent) variable is in our case 
t
t
R E V
G D P
- the proportion of corporate tax revenue to GDP was selected for several reasons.  
The GDP term itself should be in the equation in order to capture for the influence of 
rising (declining) GDP on the revenue. Evidently the revenue should, ceteris paribus, rise 
with rising GDP and, vice versa, in most of the times. On the other hand, if the GDP term 
would be incorporated on the right-hand-side of the equation (2) there would be a forceful 
threat of the spurious regression relation.262 The GDP term would itself capture the volatility 
of revenue and thus the tax variables could not be signifficant. Therefore we include the ratio 
of corporate tax revenue to GDP as explained variable. 
The ratio of those variables is important for our purposes and therefore the data for 
those two variables could be in their nominal levels (in current prices) in national currencies. 
Since the ratio would be the same for nominal values as well as for the values transferred on 
                                                 
262 Again see Yule (1926) for the first reference about the spurious regression and further e.g. Granger & 
Newbold (1974) for several Monte Carlo simulations on spurious regressions. 
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the same base year by deflator and (or) transferred to U.S. Dollar or Euro currency, we do not 
need to perform such transformation. 
The inclusion of explanatory tax variables tTAX  and 
2
tTAX  is rather straightforward 
and it should confirm the presence of Laffer curve phenomenon as would be explained below.  
6.1.C Other Factors Influencing the Size of Revenue and Their Possible 
Inclusion into the Model 
 
As we know from the previous chapter, the GDP term and the tax rate are not the 
only two variables which would influence the corporate tax revenue. Most important would 
be the tax base which could vary due to several reasons. The indirect Laffer effects such as 
variation due to the fact that there are, ceteris paribus, more (less) firms and corporations 
present in the corporate environment of the particular country, or the multinationals shift 
profits were closely described in previous chapter. These factors are to some extend implicitly 
projected into the GDP term.263 
Moreover, the tax base is also directly influenced by the legislation decisions of 
particular country (legal tax base). Since it is not possible to present any variable which would 
capture at least most of these factors and since the availability of such data is also very 
limited, we do not present any variable on the variation of  the tax base in the model. 
Apart from those, also the corporate tax rates in other foreign countries could play 
an important role in the size of the collected revenue – due to profit shifting and location 
decision of multinational firms as was already reviewed. Therefore, we try to include the 
difference of tax rates variable in our selected country and in the country with least tax rate 
in the particular year among the sample OECD countries. These differences should partially 
cover the possibilities of companies to relocate the residence or entirely transfer the 
production into country with favourable tax rates.264 We thus expect the coefficient of this 
variable to be negative since the bigger the difference, the greater the probability of  
transfering the production. 
For the sake of parsimony this variable is included into the model only in the case 
when it is significant. We also try to find the best specification of the model. Thus in each 
particular case the new model which is derived from our benchmark model is presented. 
                                                 
263 If we would use the approach as Clausing (2007) used to approximate those influences, we would lose 
significant number of observations (two thirds) as was already mentioned. Therefore we rather use this simple 
model and try to find the best econometric specification for it. 
264 This approach is not the best since it does not cover for the tax havens. Also it treats all the countries in our 
sample the same, however it should be stated that it is not the same for a company from United Kingdom to set 
up affiliate in for example Japan or Ireland. 
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6.1.D Data Range and Sources 
 
To obtain the data was not a simple task, however it was possible to obtain the main 
data for most of the chosen countries for years 1965-2006. On the other hand, there are some 
observations missing (mainly for the corporate tax rates) and we would discuss it later in the 
text. 
The tax revenue from corporate income tax for the central government level were 
collected from OECD statistics.265 The GDP at current prices was also obtained from the 
OECD statistics, however the range of those data is for many countries only from year 1970. 
Thus to obtain those additional years the International Financial Statistics of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)266 was used.  
 The most problematic part were the corporate tax rates. Two main data sources 
were used to obtain the central-level statutory corporate tax rates. In some cases and some 
time periods countries used the progressive tax system for corporate income tax. Thus there 
were several tax rates, but we use only the top statutory tax rate in those cases.267 
The tax rates were obtained from the OECD source268, however the data range is 
limited only to period since year 1981 until 2006. Therefore the additional data were collected 
from the World Tax Database, which is a project of the Office of Tax Policy Research and the 
Center for International Business Education at the University of Michigan.269  
If there is any additional source of the data for particular country used, it would be 
reported in the corresponding text.  
6.1.E  The Existence of Laffer Curve and the Revenue-maximizing Tax 
Rate 
 
The existence of the Laffer Curve would be confirmed if both the tax rates 
parameters ( ,α β ) are significant and if they have their expected signs. To obtain the bell-
shape of the Laffer curve the α  parameter should be positive and β  parameter should be 
negative.  
                                                 
265 This statistics is available at: http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/, we used  corporate taxes on profits (cathegory 1210 
of the OECD classification of taxes). 
266 This statistics is available at: http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/.  I am grateful to Mgr. Tomáš Holub, Ph.D. 
from CNB for the possibility of usage of this source.  
267 See the section concerning limitations of the used model below, where the issue is explored in more details. 
268 The tax rates are available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html  
269 The database is available at: http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm. I am indebted to Professor 
Joel B. Slemrod and Professor James R. Hines Jr. from University of Michigan for informing me about this 
database. 
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The extreme value theorem in mathematics states that the continous function on a 
closed interval must attain its maximum and minimum value, each at least once.270 We do 
have closed interval and our function is continous. If the Laffer curve would have the desired 
bell-shape, we know that the points which would minimize the ratio of revenue to GDP are on 
the border of the set – at points [ ]0;0  and [ ]min ;0TAX , where the Laffer curve intersect the x-
axis again.   
Thus we know that the revenue-maximizing tax rate ( MTAX ) point of the Laffer 
curve lies inside the set. To calculate that point we need to calculate first order conditions, 
which in this case correspond to the derivation of equation (2) with respect to TAX variable 
should be equal to zero. 
Thus: 
2 0
 
                                                                     ( 3 )
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Therefore if in our time-series and panel models the bell-shape of Laffer curve 
would be confirmed, we would use the equation (3) to obtain the revenue-maximizing tax rate 
( MTAX ) and we would discuss its magnitude. 
6.1.F The Issue of Stationarity 
 
The weak stationarity (second-order stationarity) of time series data is defined that 
first two moments of probability distribution of such a serie are invariant over time. We could 
rewrite that: stochastic process is stationary if its mean and variance are constant over time 
and the value of covariance between the two periods depends only on the distance (or lag) 
between the two time periods.271 The stationarity of time series is important in estimating 
those series. If the time series are non stationary, there are several problems of the estimation 
which arise.272  
The ratio of revenue to GDP according to the theory should not incline to be non-
stationary. However for the limited time period we are using, there may be some cases where 
                                                 
270 For the exact wording of this mathematical theorem and for its proof see e.g. Hájková et al. (2000), pp. 57-58.  
271 In Gujarati (2003), pp. 797-798. 
272 See e.g. Gujarati (2003) pp. 792-802. 
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the serie will be non-stationary. Thus we will present some tests of stationarity and comment 
them. If we discover that there the non-stationarity is present in our time serie, we however 
will not use the transformation of that particular serie using the first (or any other) differences. 
In that case we would lose the economic explanation of Laffer phenomenon behind the data. 
We would rather try to detrend the time serie by using some additional trend variable in our 
model in order to let the residuals be stationary in the situation, where it is possible. 
6.1.G Limitations of the Chosen Model 
 
There are several limitations of the above described model, which the author is 
aware of. These limitations should be outlined and discussed to a certain extend. 
As was already mentioned we use the linear model, therefore the parametrs ( ,α β ) 
cannot vary.  However, for our purposes the above specification should be sufficient. We are 
intrested in the validity of the Laffer curve and in the revenue-maximizing tax rate and thus 
the exact shape of the curve is not that important for us. Also the use of  nonlinear regression 
models brings some other difficulties and therefore we would follow the linear model.273 
Another limitation is the non-inclusion of legislative tax base variable into the 
explanatory variables of our model. As was explained above the inclusion is almost 
impossible due to the lack of data and complexity of the issue. Therefore the part of the data 
which would be unexplained by the model could be explained mainly by the development of 
this variable.  
Finally we have to mention the use of corporate tax rates data. We were able to 
obtain the statutory tax rates, however in the case of progressive taxation the top statutory tax 
rate is used. That is due to the fact that it was not possible to calculate average tax rate, since 
there is lack of the data. For the time-series part of the estimation we use only countries where 
the tax rate has never been progressive for the whole time period and therefore this problem 
did not arise. However in the case of panel data in some countries this problem would arise. 
On the other hand, in the presence of progressive taxation, the top statutory tax rate is the rate 
which mostly influence the behaviour and decision-making of firms and corporations. Also 
there was only few countries executing the progressive taxation in certain time period in our 
sample. Therefore we would conclude that this problem is not crutial and we can still present 
and comment the obtained results. Moreover the recent studies of Clausing or Brill and 
                                                 
273 For the introduction to nonlinear regression see e.g. Gujarati (2003), pp. 563-567 or Maddala (2001) pp. 392-
436. 
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Hassett,274 which were presented in chapter four use the same approach concerning the 
corporate income tax rates. 
In the next part we would present the results of time-series model for selected 
countries: Ireland, France and United Kingdom. First the results for benchamark model will 
be presented, then we would try to find the most appropriate representation for our model 
according to econometric rules and tests. In the last part of this section we would compare the 
results and draw some preliminary conclusions from these time-series models of selected 
countries. 
6.2 Ireland 
 
Ireland was selected for various reasons and we will briefly discuss them. All the 
data for our benchmark model for Ireland are available for the whole period from 1965-2006. 
Only the sources mentioned in the previous section were used in obtaining the data for 
Ireland. 
Moreover, the statutory company income tax rates have been uniform for the whole 
time period (no progressive corporate tax system). Until 1975 the statutory rates were given in 
shillings and pence per pound and they were converted into percentage. Since 1975 the tax 
rate has been given in the percentage.  
Third reason why Ireland was chosen for our model is the development of the 
corporate tax rate per se. During the 1970’s and 1980’s the tax rate reached its peak of 50% 
for several years. Since then there is a visible downward trend and from year 2003 the 
corporate tax rate is only 12.5%. That makes Ireland the country with second lowest central 
government corporate tax rate in OECD countries.275 It is obvious that the development of the 
tax rate was rather considerable and that could be an advantage for our analysis.  
In Figure 6.1 you can see the development of the corporate tax rates and tax revenue 
as percentage of GDP in Ireland over the selected period. The scale for the tax rate is on the 
left-hand-side axis and the scale for tax revenue is on the right-hand-side axis. From this 
figure there is evidently visible the downward trend of tax rates since 1990. However, this 
trend was not accompanied by the similar decrease of tax revenue. The opposite is true, the 
tax revenue steadily rised since 1989 and in the year 2006 they exceede 3.8% of GDP in 
                                                 
274 We refer to Clausing (2007) and  Brill & Hassett (2007). 
275 The lowest central government corporate tax rate is in Switzerland (8.5%), however if the sub-central 
corporate tax rates are included, the combined tax rate exceeds 20% in Switzerland. See 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html table II.1 and II.3. 
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comparism to 1.1% of GDP in 1989. These developments could suggest that apart from other 
influences, the Laffer effect is present in the case of corporate taxation in Ireland. We would 
now focus on more detailed and exact analysis of this issue.  
 
  Figure 6.1: Tax Rates and Tax Revenue in Ireland  
 
Source: see section 6.1.D, own computations 
 
6.2.A Benchmark model 
We used the data for Ireland to estimate our benchmark model by OLS given in 
Equation (2). The results from this estimation are presented in Table 6.1. The TAX variable 
refers to the corporate tax rate and TAX2 variable refers to the tax rate squared. From the 
results we can see that both these variables are significant276 and they do have the expected 
signs. If we calculate the revenue-maximizing tax rate ( MTAX )  according to Equation (3), we 
would obtain 27.11%MTAX = . 
 
 
 
                                                 
276 More precisely we can write that since p-value is less than 0.01 we reject the H0 hypothesis of coefficient of 
the variable being equal to zero on all important levels of significance (10%, 5%, 1%). Therefore in the folowing 
text we will refer to those variables as significant. If the significance of some varible would be only on 5% or 
10% level of significance it would be mentioned in the text. 
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Table 6.1: OLS Estimation of Benchamrk Model 
Sample: 1965 – 2006 
Included observations: 42 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TAX 0.228443 0.017857 12.79281 0.0000 
TAX2 -0.421323 0.041316 -10.19757 0.0000 
R-squared 0.278041 Mean dependent var 0.022220 
Adjusted R-squared 0.259992 Durbin-Watson stat 0.339970 
Source: own computations 
 
However if we explore the results of the benchmark model more thoroughly, we see 
that it has several shortcomings. Our explained variable t
t
R E V
G D P
   
embodies the non-
stationarity – it could be seen directly from the Figure 6.2, that it follows some trend and thus 
the first two moments are not invariant over-time. To confirm this prediction we perform 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of unit root.277 The test statistic in its absolute values 
(0.191)278 do not exceed the tabulated test critical values on all important levels of 
significance and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis of presence of unit root. Thus it 
deepens our suspicion of non-stationarity of explained variable serie. 
Moreover, the residuals seem to be autocorrelated. First-order serial correlation is 
indicated by the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics279, which is also represented in Table 6.1. 
The rule of thumb says that DW statistics should be around two for no serial correlation.280 If 
the value is lower than 1.5 than that is a strong indication of positive first-order serial 
correlation. In our case the value of DW statistics is only 0.34 and thus first-order serial 
correlation is significantly present in the residuals. The Correlogram of residuals (Q-statistics) 
also indicates that there is serial correlation in the residuals.  
6.2.B Adjusted Model 
 
As could be seen from the Figure 6.2 where we have the representation of our 
benchmark model (actual and fitted values on the right-hand-side axis together with residuals 
                                                 
277 This test of unit root is based on Dickey & Fuller (1979). More precisely the ADF test was executed using the 
Akaike information criterion with maximum number of lags being 9 and is implemented in Eviews software. 
However even if we change this setting (diferent information criterion or maximum number of lags) the results 
do not significantly differ. 
278 The absolute value of tabulated test critical value at 10% level of significance is 2.605. 
279 This test statistics is based on Durbin & Watson (1951). 
280 See e.g. Johnston & DiNardo (1997), chapter 6.6.1. for thorough discussion about the DW test and a table of 
significance point of the statistics. 
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on the left-hand-side axis) the residuals do perform steady growth trend. This trend could be 
the source of the non-stationarity and perhaps even of the autocorrelation of residuals. 
Therefore we try to include simple linear trend variable to detrend the data and thus remove 
the non-stationarity from the residuals.  
 
Figure 6.2: Representation of Benchmark Model 
 
Source: own computations 
Moreover we try to include the lagged t
t
R E V
G D P
   
variable since the autocorrelation 
could be caused by this rigidity in the explained variable.281 Moreover, the differences of tax 
rates were added, however these variables were not significant at any important level and thus 
they are omitted. The new representation of the model for Ireland is expressed in Equation 
(4). 
 
2 1
1
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The results of such a model are presented in Table 6.2. We can see that all the 
variables are significant. The REV(-1) refers obviously to the lagged explained variable. The 
tax variables do have their expected signs and thus the shape of the Laffer curve for Ireland 
                                                 
281 Other lags (t-2, etc.) were also tried, however they were not significant and thus we do not include them. For 
the economic explanation of this variable see below. 
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could be confirmed by this model as well. According to the Equation (3) the revenue-
maximizing tax rate is 25.5%MTAX = , which is not very different from our benchmark 
model result.282 
 
Table 6.2: OLS Estimation of Adjusted Model for Ireland 
Sample(adjusted): 1966 – 2006 
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TAX 0.052209 0.017351 3.008920 0.0047 
TAX2 -0.102348 0.034107 -3.000802 0.0048 
TREN 0.000221 5.79E-05 3.816767 0.0005 
REV(-1) 0.626283 0.104812 5.975289 0.0000 
R-squared 0.932852 Mean dependent var 0.022237 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927408 Durbin-Watson stat 2.366287 
Source: own computations 
6.2.C The Properties of Adjusted Model 
 
Now we should examine if we have improved the properties and characteristics of 
our benchmark model by adding the linear trend and lagged explained variable. Since the 
trend variable is significant we succeded in detrending the time series. This confirms the 
ADF test of unit root for residuals. The test statistics in the absolute values (4.259) exceeds 
the tabulated test critical values on all important levels of significance (the value for 1% level 
of significance is 3.6) and thus we reject the null hypothesis of presence of unit root on 1% 
level of significance. The residuals thus do reflect the stationarity in mean as was desired. 
The DW statistics (2.37) also indicates that there should be no significant first-order 
serial correlation in the residuals.283 This result is confirmed by the correlogram of residuals 
which rejects also higher-order correlation, since the Q-statistics are not significant at any lag. 
To test whether the heteroskedasticity of residuals (nonconstant variance of error- 
terms)284 is present we can use the White’s test. It basically regresses the residuals on all other 
                                                 
282 Note that we have omitted the lagged t
t
R E V
G D P
   
term in the computing of revenue-maximizing tax rate. 
283 However the result could be dubious since we included the lagged dependent variable in the model. Thus the 
DW statistics is biased towards rejecting the significant serial correlation – see e.g. Baltagi (2002), pp. 146-147. 
On the other hand, also the correlogram confirms the result of no significant first-order correlation.  
284 For introduction to the issue of heteroskedasticity see e.g. Gujarati (2003), pp. 387-440 or Maddala (2001) pp. 
199-224.  
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variables.285 Since all the p-values in the test are not significant, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity of residuals and that is also welcomed result. 
Jarque-Bera (JB) test of normality of residuals286 exhibits the p-value of 0.388 and 
thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed error-terms. Moreover, the 
R2 and adjusted R2 increased significantly287 and therefore there is very few information 
which is not explained by the model adjusted according to the Equation (4).    
Thus the adjusted model seems to be appropriate. All the included variables are 
significant, the residuals exhibit all the neccesary assumtions of the classical regression model 
and the model explains most of the information.   
6.2.D Economic Explanation of Added Variables 
 
Since we added the trend variable and the lagged value of dependent variable we 
should examine their economic meaning in our model. If we focus on the former, it basically 
says that the revenue to GDP from corporate income tax gradually rised in the examined 
period (mainly in its second half – see Figure 6.1) independently on the tax rate. It is essential 
to mention that most of the significance could be explained by the growing legal tax base of 
corporate income tax in Ireland. For example between 1982 and 2005 Ireland reduced tax 
depreciation rates for investment in plant and machinery rather significantly. The present 
value of depreciation allowances decreased from 100 per cent to 66 per cent during the 
mentioned period and this less generous system of allowences obviously contributed to the 
base broadening.288 As was already mention the legal tax base is very complex issue, however 
the trend of base broadening in Ireland was evident. 
Another factor partialy explaining the significant trend variable could be the 
corporate environment in Ireland. The tax rate, per se, recorded significant decline in the 
second period of our examined time period. Moreover, the overall corporate environment 
for companies has improved and that could have attracted the foreign capital and foreign 
firms to set up a business in Ireland.289 Thus it obviously attracted also the shifting of profits 
                                                 
285 See White (1980) for the exact specification of this test. This test is implemented in Eviews software. 
286 This test is based on Jarque & Bera (1987). We have to be aware of the fact that this test is assymptotic 
(large-sample) and thus for our model the results could be biased.The test is implemented in Eviews software. 
287 The benchmark model was succesfull only for 26% of predicting the values of explained variable according 
to adjusted R2, however the adjusted model embodies the success in predicting those values in our sample of 
almost 93%. 
288 See OECD (2007), pp. 24-25 for detailed discussion. 
289 See e.g. http://www.askireland.com/locate.asp for exact information about setting up a business in Ireland and 
its advantages. 
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and it encouraged multinationals from other countries to set up an affiliate as we have 
discussed in previous chapter. 
Moreover, Ireland accessed the EC in 1973 and that step further simplified the profit 
shifting and locational issues of multinational corporations. Also Ireland received generous 
money resources from EC funds and that could have stimulated the corporate sector and 
improved corporate environment.290 We cannot forget that this variable could be also partially 
explained by the non-Laffer indirect factors, which were also shortly discussed in previous 
chapter.  
The significance of the latter variable (lagged value of dependent variable) could be 
explained by the rigidity of the revenue collection. The companies plans are in the long-term 
horizont and sudden change in economic conditions thus does not have to have immediate 
impact on all companies. Therefore there could be some delay in the reaction of companies 
and thus this rigidity could take place. 
6.3 France 
 
As a second country to investigate and try to estimate its Laffer curve for corporate 
income taxation we have chosen France. As in the case of Ireland the data for France are 
available for the whole period of 1965 – 2006. The sources for the data were described in 
section 6.1.D. 
The statutory corporate income tax rates have been uniform for the whole time 
period291 as in the case of Ireland. However, the development of tax rates per se did not 
represented such great volatility. As you can see from Figure 6.1.D, where the corporate tax 
rates and tax revenue as percentage of GDP in France are presented, the tax rate was stable 
until 1986. Thus in years 1965 to 1986 the corporate statutory tax rate was 50% and since 
then there was a decline up to year 1993. Since then the tax rate is stable again and it reaches 
33.3%. 
The development of tax revenue to GDP was relatively stable and it reached its peak 
in year 2001, when the corporate tax revenue were almost 3.4% of GDP. However, we do not 
perceive such an upward trend as in the case of Ireland. 
 
                                                 
290 See e.g. http://www.iro.ie/EU-structural-funds.html for a brief evaluation of effects of these EC and EU funds 
on development of Ireland.  
291 The tax rates do not include local business tax or the turnover based solidarity tax. 
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Figure 6.3: Tax Rates and Tax Revenue in France 
 
Source: own computations 
 
6.3.A Benchmark model 
 
The benchmark model given in Equation (2) was again estimated by OLS. The 
results from this estimation are presented in Table 6.3. From the results we can see that both 
tax variables (tax rate and tax rate2) are significant on all important levels of significance and 
moreover they possess the expected signs. According to Equation (3) the revenue-maximizing 
tax rate ( MTAX )  would be 33.76%MTAX = . 
 
Table 6.3: OLS Estimation of Benchmark Model for France 
Sample: 1965 2006 
Included observations: 42 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TAX 0.149711 0.007953 18.82483 0.0000 
TAX2 -0.221699 0.017262 -12.84351 0.0000 
R-squared 0.408530 Mean dependent var 0.022097 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393744 Durbin-Watson stat 0.662608 
Source: own computations 
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As in the case of Ireland we now review the characteristics of this benchmark model 
for France. The dependent variable again seems to be non-stationary. The test statistic of ADF 
test of unit root in its absolute values (1.753)292 does not exceed the tabulated test critical 
values on all important levels of significance. Although the result is much better than in the 
case of benchmark model for Ireland we still cannot reject the null hypothesis of presence of 
unit root. 
Moreover, the low level of DW statistics (0.66) indicates the presence of  first-order 
serial correlation in residuas. The Q-statistics in Correlogram also indicates the serial 
correlation in the residuals.  
6.3.B Adjusted Model 
 
The best suitable way how to deal with serial correlation in residuals in this case 
would be to incorporate the first-order autoregressive term AR (1) into our model.293 The 
AR(1) could be specified as follows: 1t t tε ρε µ−= + , where the tε  are the residuals from our 
benchmark regression.294  
We further try to include the trend variable to detrend the data, however in the case 
of  France it is not significant and therefore we do not include it into reported results. The 
difference of tax rates was also added, however likewise in previous case it is not significant 
and therefore we do not include it. The adjusted model is thus described by the Equation (5). 
 
2
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The results of a model given by Equation (5) for France are presented in Table 6.4. 
We can see that all the variables are significant. The AR(1) variable refers to the the first-
order autoregressive term. The tax variables again exhibit the expected signs and both are 
significant and thus the shape of the Laffer curve for France could be confirmed by the 
adjusted model as well. According to the Equation (3) we can calculate the revenue-
                                                 
292 The absolute value of tabulated test critical value at 10% level of significance is 2.605, we again executed the 
test using the Akaike information criterion with maximum number of lags being 9. With other specifications the 
results do not differ significantly. 
293 The lagged dependent variable was also tried, however the the inclusion of AR(1) term brings significantly 
better results. 
294 For the exact way how the AR (1) term is computed see e.g. Fair (1984), pp. 210-214. 
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maximizing tax rate which reaches 34.43%MTAX = , and thus it is again close to our 
benchmark results. 
 
Table 6.4: OLS Estimation of Adjusted Model for France 
Sample(adjusted): 1966 2006 
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TAX 0.147185 0.017306 8.504721 0.0000 
TAX2 -0.213770 0.037947 -5.633423 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.682717 0.124684 5.475569 0.0000 
R-squared 0.660913 Mean dependent var 0.022199 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643066 Durbin-Watson stat 2.119661 
Source: own computations 
 
You can also see the representation of our adjusted model in Figure 6.4 (actual and 
fitted values on the right-hand-side axis together with residuals on the left-hand-side axis). 
This Figure indicates that the residuals of adjusted model seem to be stationary. Let us now 
review the properties of adjusted model more thoroughly. 
 
Figure 6.4: Representation of Adjusted Model for France 
 
 
 Source: own computations  
  83
6.3.C The Properties of Adjusted Model295 
 
The positive AR(1) coefficient in Table 6.4 indicates that the residuals were 
positively correlated and it is parallel to the ρ coefficient in Equation (5). Further are thus 
examined the remainder disturbances ( tµ in Equation (5)). Our hypothesis about stationarity 
in mean in residuals is confirmed by the ADF test of unit root for residuals. The test statistics 
in its absolute values (6.58) and that exceeds the tabulated test critical values on all important 
levels of significance. Therefore we can reject the null hypothesis of presence of unit root on 
1% level of significance.  
When we evaluate the autocorrelation, the DW statistics (2.12) indicates no 
significant first-order serial correlation in the residuals. The Q-statistics in the correlogram of 
residuals are not significant at any lag and that rejects also higher-order correlation. 
 With the use of White’s test we can again test the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
The p-values in the test are not significant and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity of residuals. 
When we focus on the normality of residuals, the JB test exhibits the p-value of 
0.65, therefore the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals cannot be rejected. 
Moreover, the R2 and adjusted R2 increased rather considerably.296 Yet there is some 
information which is not explained by the adjusted model and that could be the development 
of legal tax base and other non-Laffer effeects influencing the tax revenue, which were 
discussed in previous chapter. 
This adjusted model is therefore considered to be appropriate, the R2 is reasonably 
high and the the error terms do exhibit all the neccesary assumtions of the classical regression 
model. 
 
6.3.D Economic Meaning of Adjusted Model 
 
In the adjusted model for France we did not include the trend variable. However we 
do not consider this to be a major problem, since the development of the legal tax base of 
corporate income taxation in France was probably not that significant as in Ireland. For 
                                                 
295 In this case, in the case of United Kingdom and in the panel data model we do not mention the exact 
references for the used tests (White test, JB test etc.) – see adjusted model of Ireland for those references. 
296 According to adjusted R2 the benchmark model was succesfull  for 39% of predicting the values of explained 
variable, the adjusted model embodies R2 of over 64%. 
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example the present value of depreciation allowances did not decrease much and thus it did 
not influence the legal tax base significantly.297   
The economic interpretation of AR(1) term is rather challenging. We did include this 
term mainly from the econometric reasons. It helped us to solve the issue of positive serial 
correlation in the residuals. Since the specification of AR(1) term is based on the fact that 
residuals are correlated with its lagged values, we can try to interpret this term as a kind of 
sluggishness of tax revenue. They react to the change of parametrs (or to external shock) 
partially with some delay.  
6.4 United Kingdom 
 
As a last country we have selected the United Kingdom. The data available are since 
year 1970, we were not able to find the data on corporate tax rates in the period of 1965-1969. 
The sources for the data were described in section 6.1.D. Moreover, we used Her Majesty 
Revenue & Customs web pages to get the data for tax rates in United Kingdom in earlier 
periods (1970-1980).298 The statutory corporate income tax rates were again uniform for the 
whole time period of 1970-2006. 
Figure 6.5: Tax Rates and Tax Revenue in the United Kingdom 
 
Source:own computations 
                                                 
297 See OECD (2007), figure 1.5 on p. 25. 
298 Available at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/menus/aboutmenu.htm  
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As you can see from Figure 6.5, where the corporate tax rates and tax revenue as 
percentage of GDP in UK are presented, the tax rate reached 52% in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
and then it declined. The statutory tax rate in year 2006 was 30%. 
The development of tax revenue to GDP was rather volatile as you can see from the 
Figure 6.5 and it reached its top in year 1985, when the revenue were around 4.7%. We do not 
perceive any real trend in the tax revenue data for United Kingdom. 
6.4.A Adjusted Model 
 
The benchamark model did have similar imperfections as in the case of Ireland and 
France (mainly the serial correlation in residuals). For the sake of brevity we do not present 
the results of benchmark model, but we directly consider the adjusted model. We have found 
out that the best specification for the data of United Kingdom is the model with AR (1) term 
represented in the Equation (5). Moreover, the difference of tax rates term became not 
significant and therefore it is not reported. Also the trend variable was not significant. The 
results of adjusted model for United Kingdom are presented in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5: OLS Estimation of Adjusted Model for UK 
Sample (adjusted): 1971 2006   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
TAX 0.159017 0.035288 4.506246 0.0001 
TAX2 -0.180406 0.076113 -2.370238 0.0238 
AR(1) 0.817013 0.130546 6.258419 0.0000 
R-squared 0.626076 Mean dependent var 0.031755 
Adjusted R-squared 0.603414 Durbin-Watson stat 1.465270 
Source: own computations 
 
The tax variables again exhibit the expected signs, the tax variable is significant at 1% 
level of significance and tax2 is significant on 5% level of significance. Thus the shape of the 
Laffer curve for United Kingdom is confirmed by this adjusted model. The revenue-
maximizing tax rate according to our results would be equal to 44.07%MTAX = . The positive 
coefficient at AR (1) term again coincides with ρ  in Equation (5). 
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6.4.B The Properties of Adjusted Model 
 
Again we would examine the properties of remainder disturbances ( tµ in Equation 
(5)). We can reject the null hypothesis of presence of unit root in those disturbances on 1% 
level of significance. It is because the ADF test statistics in its absolute values (4.02)299  
exceeds the tabulated test critical values on all important levels of significance.  
When we evaluate the autocorrelation, the result of DW statistics (1.46) is rather 
dubious. However, the correlogram of remainder disturbances rejects serial-correlation. 
Moreover if we include the AR(2) term into our model, it is prooved to be not significant. 
 The presence of heteroskedasticity is again tested by the White’s test. All the p-
values in the test are not significant, therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity in remainder error terms. 
The JB test exhibits the p-value of 0.39 and therefore the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed residuals cannot be rejected. The adjusted R2 reaches 60% (in the benchmark 
model represented by the Equation (2) the adjusted R2 was solely 8%) which is fairly good, 
however yet there is some information which is not explained by the adjusted model (such as 
legal tax base developments or other non-Laffer effects in the United Kingdom). Since we 
reviewed the properties of the adjusted model, it seems to be appropriate specification for 
United Kingdom.  
 
6.4.C Country-Specific Results 
 
In Figure 6.6 you can see the shapes of Laffer curves for corporate income taxation 
for France and the United Kingdom according to our specification. We do not include Ireland 
into the graph because of different specification of the model (mainly the term trend), which 
we would not be able to capture. Our results suggest that the revenue-maximizing tax rate 
could be around 26% in Ireland, 34% in France and up to 44% in the United Kingdom. Thus 
we have seen that those rates and corresponding Laffer curves for corporate income taxation 
vary over the selected countries. There could be several reasons for that variation.  
Evidently the corporate tax collection differs in those countries in many ways. The 
legal tax base rules are different in those countries, the corporate environment as well as other 
legal regulations may vary as well. Thus the Laffer effects influencing the tax base, which 
                                                 
299 Again the ADF test was executed using the Akaike information criterion with maximum number of lags   
being 9. 
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were reviewed in the previous chapter, may influence the revenue differently in different 
countries for the same tax change. Therefore in Ireland and to lower extend in France the 
substantial decrease in tax rates constituted the rise of the corresponding tax revenue. On the 
other hand, the similar decrease in United Kingdom did not have such straigtforward response 
in tax revenue collection (see Figures 6.1, 6.3 and 6.5). Those country-specific reactions on 
changes in tax rates then constitue such diversified results of our estimates of corporate tax 
Laffer curves.  
 
Figure 6.6: Estimated Laffer Curves for France and UK300 
 
Source: own computations 
6.4.D Concluding Remarks 
 
We tried to estimate the Laffer effects in three selected OECD countries – Ireland, 
France and the United Kingdom. We used simple benchmark model and then for each country 
we tried to find the most appropriate adjusted model. We then have seen that there are 
different ‘best’ speficifations for different countries and the resuls might differ significantly as 
well. 
                                                 
300 On the x-axis there is corporate tax rate and on the y-axis there are corresponding corporate tax revenue. The 
revenue are only approximate, because the AR(1) term is not included into these calculations. The more 
important is the shape of the curves and the revenue-maximizing point. 
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We can conclude that in each country the tax rates are in its normal area (not 
prohibitive) of Laffer curve. Although according to our analysis there were some time periods 
(for example 1970’s and 1980’s in Ireland) when each of these countries operated in the 
prohibitive area of Laffer curve and thus the corporate tax rates were excessively high. 
Moreover, in the adjusted model the difference of tax rates variable was not 
significant. However it does not mean, that there is no influence of foreign corporate tax rates 
on the corresponding tax revenue. It is rather connected with the problems of this variable 
which were discussed in the first part of this chapter. The unexplained part of the model 
would attribute mainly to legal tax base variation and to other non-Laffer effects. 
Despite the fact, that we have seen that the estimations differ in the countries, we 
will present a panel data model in the following chapter in order to pool the data for 20 OECD 
countries together.  
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7 Panel Data Model for 20 OECD Countries 
 
In the previous chapter we examined the existence of Laffer curve in three selected 
OECD countries and we have seen that for each country there is different specification which 
fits the data the best. However in this chapter we would try to pool the data together for 
OECD countries and see whether it is possible to estimate the Laffer curve and capture the 
Laffer effects for corporate income taxation. 
7.1 Selected Countries and Data Description 
 
As was already mentioned we would examine the panel data of 20 OECD countries 
for time period 1965 to 2006. There are several reasons why only 20 countries are 
incorporated into our panel data model and we would briefly discuss them. 4 countries could 
be classified as post-communist countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) 
and for those countries we were not able to find the data until the year 1990. Moreover, the 
data for earlier periods would probably not be applicable since the communist regimes were 
conducting the command economy.  
Iceland, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey were not 
included into our model because of transparent lack of corporate tax rates data in earlier 
periods. Therefore in our panel data model we include those 20 countries: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
The sources of the data were already described in section 6.1.D. Moreover we used 
Her Majesty Revenue & Customs web pages to get the data for tax rates in United Kingdom 
in earlier periods (1970-1980).301 
Since we try to include as many observations as possible for our 20 OECD countries 
we will have unbalanced panel, where some observations are missing. We lack the data for 
Australia (1976-1979), Austria (1974-1979), Greece (1974-1979), Denmark (1978-1979) and 
United Kingdom (1965-1969). These data are missing since we were not able to obtain the 
corporate income tax rates for those countries in the reported years. Moreover, we lack the 
                                                 
301 Available at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/menus/aboutmenu.htm  
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 data in year 2006 for Australia and Greece, since we were not able to obtain the 
corresponding tax revenue for that year. 
7.2 Benchmark Model 
 
We would proceed as in previous chapter and thus we at first construct simple 
benchamrk model for the time period of 1965-2006 and report its results. Then we would try 
to find the best spocification of the model (adjusted model) for our panel data. The simple 
benchmark model is presented in Equation (6) 
 
2
1 2                 ( 6 )
w h e r e   = +    
i t
i t i t i t
i t
i t i i t
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ε
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= ∗ + ∗ +
 
 
The i subscript stands for the country-specific information and thus range from 1 to 
20 (N) and t subscript represents the year and therefore it ranges from 1965 until 2006. We 
are using the one-way error component model for the disturbances. Therefore, iµ  denotes the 
unobservable country-specific effect and itν stands for the remainder disturbance. 
The other used variables have the same meaning as in previous chapter, only the 
country-specific subscript is added. We have chosen the fixed effects model302, where iµ  are 
assumed to be fixed parametrs to be estimated, rather than random effects model. The theory 
suggests that if we have this macro-level data where N is not large as in our case, the proper 
model to use is the fixed effects model.303 Also we expect that the remainder disturbances 
could be correlated as we have seen in the time-series models and this also suggests to use 
fixed effects model.304 The results of this panel data with fixed effects model are presented in 
table 7.1.305 
                                                 
302 For the way how the fixed effects are constructed see Baltagi (2005), pp.12-14. 
303 See e.g. Baltagi (2005), p.12. 
304 See the discussion in Gujarati (2003), pp.650-651. 
305 We had to choose a bit different approach of entering the equation specification into Eviews. If we enter the 
dependent variable followed by the list of regressors solely, the Eviews would incorporate and compute also the 
intercept term same for all the countries in the panel and thus it would bias the results. Our goal is to not include 
the intercept as the theory suggests. Therefore we had to enter the explicit equation such as: 
REV=C(1)*TAX+C(2)*TAX2 in order to get the results without the intercept term as are presented in our 
results’ tables. Also note that we do not include the country-specific effects into our results’ tables. 
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Table 7.1: Estimation of Benchmark Panel Data Model 
 
Source: own computations 
 
As we can see both the tax variables (coefficients C(1) and C(2)) are significant and 
have expected signs. If we calculate the revenue-maximizing tax rate ( MTAX )  according to 
Equation (3), we would obtain 34.03%MTAX = . 
7.2.A Fixed Effects or Simple Pooled OLS method ? 
 
We now should examine whether we need to include the country specific effects and 
thus if a  simple common constant method (pooled OLS method) is not sufficient for our data.  
We can perform a simple Chow test (F-test) testing for joint significance of the of the added 
dummies (for individual country effects). Thus the null hypothesis is specified as: 
0 1 2 19: ... 0H µ µ µ= = = = .  
The F-test takes this form:306
( ) ( ) 0
0 1, ( 1)
/ 1
/( )
H
N N T K
RRSS URSS N
F F
URSS NT N K − − −
− −= − − ∼ , 
where the RRSS stands for restricted residual sum of squares (pooled OLS method) and 
URSS denotes unrestricted residual sum of squares (fixed effects model). For our model we 
have N=20, NT=815307, K=2 and RRSS=0.136, URSS=0.091.308 The F-statistics critical value 
is 20.6 and thus the p-value for our specification is 0.00. We therefore can reject the H0 and 
thus we consider the fixed effects model appropriate for our purposes. 
                                                 
306 Taken from Baltagi (2005), p.13. 
307 Note that we have some observation missing and therefore the number of observations is 815 and not 840. 
308 The sum of squares were obtained from the estimation results of corresponding regressions. 
Sample: 1965 2006   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 815  
REV=C(1)*TAX+C(2)*TAX2   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.167245 0.005961 28.05572 0.0000 
C(2) -0.245697 0.014163 -17.34766 0.0000 
R-squared 0.349982 Mean dependent var 0.026545 
Adjusted R-squared 0.333609 Durbin-Watson stat 0.221580 
  92
However if we have a closer look on our benchmark model results we see that value 
of DW statistics is rather low and also the correlogram of remainder disturbances (Q-
statistics) confirms that we have problem with serial correlation of those disturbances ( itν ).  
7.3 Adjusted Model 
 
Since there is a problem of serial correlation we try to incorporate the AR(1) term 
into our equation.309 Moreover, we also try to include the difference of tax rates variable, 
however this variable is not significant at any important level of significance and therefore for 
the sake of parsimony of our model, we do not include it into reported results. Thus the proper 
specification of our adjusted model is specified by Equation  (7). 
( )
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The results of the adjusted model with AR(1) term are presented in Table 7.2. The 
C(3) variable corresponds to the AR term and thus the estimated coefficient coincides with ρ  
as is specified in Equation (7). 
Table 7.2: Estimation of Adjusted Panel Data Model 
Sample (adjusted): 1966 2006   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 791  
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations  
REV=C(1)*TAX+C(2)*TAX2+[AR(1)=C(3)]  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.149873 0.015405 9.728632 0.0000 
C(2) -0.178273 0.023054 -7.732991 0.0000 
C(3) 0.936379 0.016663 56.19624 0.0000 
R-squared 0.868536 Mean dependent var 0.026694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.864946 Durbin-Watson stat 1.909733 
Source: own computations 
 
We can see that all the variables are significantly different from zero and moreover 
the adjusted model fits the data better (the adjusted R2 increased significantly to 86.5%). The 
revenue-maximizing tax rate according to Equation (3) would equal to 42.03%MTAX = .  
                                                 
309 See Baltagi (2005), pp. 84-86 for the exact way how the AR(1) term is estimated. 
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Thus this rate is significantly greater than in the benchmark model. The values of 
coefficiets should be assymptotically same with the inclusion of AR(1) term. Therefore we 
can conclude that the AR term improved the quality of the model and the results are thus more 
efficient (less incorect). The economic interpretation of the AR(1) term would be same as in 
previous chapter. However, the main reason for inclusion of this term was to solve the 
problem of serial-correlation. 
DW statistics indicates that with inclusion of AR term there should be no other first 
order serial correlation of our new error terms itξ . This is also confirmed by the correlogram 
(Q-statistics), which also rejects higher order serial correlation.  
On the other hand, the JB test statistics is very high (the reported value is 5762) and 
thus it exhibits the p-value of 0.0 and we therefore can reject the hypothesis of normally 
distributed error terms ( itξ ). From the Figure 5.4 and also from the residual table we see that 
the country with the most outlier observations is Norway. Thus we try to estimate the adjusted 
model only for 19 countries without Norway. The results of such a model are presented in 
Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Estimation of Adjusted Panel Data Model without Norway 
Sample: 1965 2006 IF CROSSID <>16  
Cross-sections included: 19   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 750  
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations  
REV=C(1)*TAX+C(2)*TAX2+[AR(1)=C(3)]  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.137788 0.008970 15.36089 0.0000 
C(2) -0.166729 0.016023 -10.40525 0.0000 
C(3) 0.894863 0.018758 47.70464 0.0000 
R-squared 0.854240 Mean dependent var 0.025748 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850241 Durbin-Watson stat 2.062325 
Source: own computations 
 
 
As we can see the results are not significantly different from the previous case. All 
three variables are significant, they have their expected signs and the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate is equal to 41.3%MTAX = . There is no other serial correlation in the residuals 
itξ (confirmed by DW statistics and correlogram of error terms). 
The JB statistics improved a lot (the value reported is 104), but we still reject the 
hypothesis of normally distributed error terms. However, we do not consider that to be a 
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major problem and thus we do not perform any transformation which could deviate the 
results.310 In the following parts of this chapter we will thus report the results for the whole 
panel as well as for the panel with 19 OECD countries (without Norway). 
7.3.A Lagged Tax Rates 
 
We examine our adjusted model for one-period lagged tax variables. The reason to 
examine this is that the tax rate change might possibly happen in the middle of the year. 
Moreover, corporate tax revenue could react with a lag to the change in the tax rate – due to 
some adjustment mechanisms. The adjusted model represented by Equation (7) then slightly 
modifies to Equation (8). 
( )
2
1 1 2 1
1
                ( 8 )
w h e r e   = +   = +      
i t
i t i t i t
i t
i t i i t i t i t i t
R E V c T A X c T A X
G D P
a n d A R t e r m
ε
ε µ ν ν ρ ν ξ
− −
−
= ∗ + ∗ +
 
We do not include both present tax rates and lagged tax rates into one equation 
because of the problem of multicollinearity which would arise.311 The results for the whole 
panel of 20 countries and for 19 countries without Norway are presented in the Table 7.4, 
where there are reported the values of coefficients, standard errors and P-values. Also 
adjusted R2, DW statistics and revenue-maximizing tax rate are presented. 
Table 7.4: Estimation of Adjusted Panel Data Model for Lagged Tax Rates 
  20 countries 19 countries (without Norway)
  Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. 
Tax (t-1) 0.159 0.015 0.000 0.144 0.009 0.000 
Tax2 (t-1) -0.195 0.023 0.000 -0.177 0.016 0.000 
AR (1) 0.931 0.017 0.000 0.889 0.019 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.865     0.851     
DW stat. 1.928     2.089     
TAXM 40.80%     40.63%     
Source: own computations 
The results are as expected, all variables are significant and we do not face the 
additional problem of serial autocorrelation (as it is confirmed by correlogram of 
disturbancesξ ). 
                                                 
310 The results of our regression model are valid even with non-normality of residuals. Formally the t-statistics 
are not precise (confidence intervals are unreliable), however the level of coefficient and their significance are 
not biased. See e.g. Maddala (2001), pp. 432-433.  
311 See e.g. Maddala (2001), pp. 267-291 for discussion. 
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Thus we can conclude that since the tax rates do not vary significantly in time, the 
results with one-period lagged tax rates values are very similar to the adjusted model results.  
7.3.B Estimations for Different Time Periods 
 
Other intresting aspect could be to examine whether the results are constant through 
time or whether the shape of the Laffer curve for corporate income taxation was different for 
different time periods. Therefore we divide our time range into two ten-year and two eleven-
year periods (1965-1974, 1975-1984, 1985-1995, 1996-2006). We examine the results of 
adjusted model represented by Equation (7) in these time periods. The results are reported in 
the Table 7.5.  
 
Table 7.5: Estimation of Adjusted Panel Data Model for Time Subsamples 
  1965-1974 (20 countries) 1965-1974 (19 countries) 1975-1984 (20 countries) 
  Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. Coeff. Std. Er. Prob.
Tax 0.067 0.013 0.000 0.064 0.014 0.000 0.117 0.024 0.000 
Tax2 -0.032 0.031 0.303 -0.023 0.032 0.482 -0.141 0.051 0.006 
AR (1) 0.610 0.077 0.000 0.601 0.081 0.000 0.805 0.047 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.910     0.906     0.863     
DW stat. 1.782     1.788     1.727     
TAXM             41.69%     
 1975-1984 (19 countries) 1985-1995 (20 countries) 1985-1995 (19 countries) 
 Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. Coeff. Std. Er. Prob.
Tax 0.110 0.019 0.000 0.130 0.009 0.000 0.129 0.008 0.000 
Tax2 -0.132 0.042 0.002 -0.161 0.021 0.000 -0.161 0.019 0.000 
AR (1) 0.590 0.063 0.000 0.672 0.050 0.000 0.692 0.056 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.882     0.816     0.835     
DW stat. 1.667     1.777     1.870     
TAXM 41.57%     40.27%     39.98%     
 1996-2006 (20 countries) 1996-2006 (19 countries)       
 Coeff. Std. Er. Prob. Coeff. Std. Er. Prob.       
Tax 0.206 0.020 0.000 0.178 0.014 0.000       
Tax2 -0.249 0.049 0.000 -0.218 0.040 0.000       
AR (1) 0.789 0.048 0.000 0.634 0.057 0.000       
Adjusted R2 0.864     0.795           
DW stat. 2.118     2.070           
TAXM 41.32%     40.66%           
Source: own computations 
 
We report the values of coefficients, standard errors and P-values, moreover we 
include adjusted R2 and DW statistics for every subsample. The estimated coefficient at 
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AR(1) term corresponds to the ρ  from the Equation (7). We also computed the revenue-
maximizing tax rate for each estimated model.  
There could be several conclusions drawn from our results. The results do not differ 
much for panel with 20 countries and for panel without Norway. The tax2 variable was not 
significanty different from zero in the first subsample (1965-1974) and thus we also did not 
computed the revenue-maximizing tax rate. Therefore the shape of Laffer curve is not such 
strongly confirmed for that time period.  
In all other subsamples all variables are significant and of expected signs. Also there 
is no major problem with serial correlation as DW statistics and also correlogram of residuals 
suggest. The revenue-maximizing tax rate does not differ significantly in the different time 
sub-periods and reaches around 40-41.5%.    
Figure 7.1 then shows the estimated Laffer curve for the whole sample of 20 OECD 
countries for the whole time period and for the last time period 1996-2006.  
Figure 7.1: Estimated Laffer Curves for 1965-2006 and for 1996-2006312 
 
Source: own computations 
We can thus draw conclusion that the curve according to our model became steeper 
in recent years and thus the penalty for being in the prohibitive area has increased. 
                                                 
312 On the x-axis there is corporate tax rate and on the y-axis there are corresponding corporate tax revenue. The 
revenue are only approximate, because the AR(1) term is not included into these calculations. 
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7.3.C Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter we have estimated the Laffer curve for corporate income taxation for 
20 OECD countries for time period of 1965-2006. We have found that the best suitable model 
is represented by Equation (7) and we estimated that on our panel data using fixed effects. 
The traditional shape of the Laffer curve was confirmed by our results, only in the first sub-
period (1965-1974) the tax2 variable was not significant. We tried to include the difference of 
tax rates variable in order to proxy for the possibility to shift profits, however this variable 
was not significant and therefore we did not include it into our model and results. However, 
this does not say that there are no effects of foreign corporate tax rates on the corresponding 
tax revenue as was already discussed in previous chapter. 
The revenue-maximizing tax rate according to our specification is around 40% to 
41% for our sample of OECD countries. Moreover, it seems to be time-invariant. According 
to this results the selected OECD countries seem to be in its normal area of the Laffer curve, 
since the statutory corporate tax rates were in year 2006 lower than 40% in all 20 countries. 
Evidently there were time-periods, when according to our results some countries were in the 
prohibitive areas of the Laffer curve. The following chapter would summarize our results and 
further discuss them. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this thesis we focused on the issue of Laffer effects and Laffer curve for the 
corporate income taxation. In first two chapters we discussed the taxation issue in general. 
The history of taxation was examined in the first chapter and in the following chapter we 
explored the theory of taxation and tax systems. The emphasis was put on the explanation of 
the size of the government sector. In folowing chapters we focused on the issue of Laffer 
curve and Laffer effects. We explored the theory behind the Laffer curve phenomenon and in 
the consequent chapter we have reviewed the literature on estimation of Laffer curve and (or) 
Laffer effects. 
 Three final chapters aimed to identify and estimate the Laffer effects of the 
corporate income taxation. First the development and its possible explanations of corporate 
income tax revenue and rates in sample of 20 OECD countries was investigated. We have 
identified several effects (Laffer and non-Laffer effects), which could positively influence the 
tax base and thus tax revenue when the corporate income tax is lowered. Then we presented 
the econometric model and estimated the Laffer curve for three selected countries (Ireland, 
France and the United Kingdom). In following chapter the Laffer curve was estimated for the 
whole sample of 20 OECD countries on panel data for the time period from 1965 to 2006. 
We can draw several intresting conclusions from our analysis. Foremost, we have 
confirmed the traditional shape of the Laffer curve for corporate income taxation for our 
sample countries. The panel data estimates would suggest that the revenue-maximizing tax 
rate is around 41% for our sample countries. This would imply that none of our sample 
countries is at the prohibitive range of the Laffer curve. However, most of the countries 
were in the prohibitive (inefficient) part of the Laffer curve for some time periods, since their 
corporate tax rates exceeded 41%. Therefore, factors which influenced the trend in decline of 
corporate statutory tax rates (they were reviewed in chapter five) resulted in the gain of 
efficiency from that point of view, since the corporate tax rates seem not to be in their 
prohibitive areas of the Laffer curve.313   
Moreover we can conclude that the Laffer effects did play significant role in the 
development of the corporate tax revenue. On the other hand, since on average the corporate 
                                                 
313 Note that we do not state whether the present corporate tax rates are optimal or they should be lowered or 
increased. The theory of optimal taxation is a complex issue (see chapter two of this thesis). Our findings solely 
suggest that we do not observe the present corporate tax rates to be in the prohibitive area of the Laffer curve and 
thus they seem to be more efficient from that point of view.  
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statutory tax rates are more than 10% lower than the revenue-maximizing tax rates in our 
sample countries and the revenue did not significantly declined in recent years (see Figure 
5.3) the non-Laffer factors influencing the tax revenue were also significant. As such 
factors we can mention the development of legal tax base, or stricter enforcement of tax laws. 
Lastly our analysis in chapter six suggests that if we would like to estimate the 
Laffer curve for certain country and draw some policy conclusions about the corporate tax 
rate, we should use a country-specific estimation. We have seen that the appropriate model 
specification could differ for different countries. Moreover, our estimates show that the 
revenue maximizing tax rate differs significantly across our sample countries (27% in Ireland 
X 44% in the United Kingdom). Thus, solely the country specific estimation could cover for 
all the possible specifications of particular countries.   
Although, our approach has several limitations (those were outlined in chapter six), 
our results do correspond to results of Clausing and those of Brill and Hassett314 (however the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate is little higher in our case than estimated by Brill and Hassett).  
Further research could for example try to approximate legal tax base and other non-Laffer 
effects to improve the predicative ability of the used econometric models. 
                                                 
314 In Clausing (2007), Brill & Hassett (2007). 
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